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purpose of granting patents is to reward invention, today many scholars
instead attempt to justify the patent system based on its role in facilitating
information exchange and enabling technical coordination among firms. This
change in justification is controversial, and its viability remains a fiercely
contested question. But despite intense attention at the level of theory, little has
been said about the consequences of this debate for patent policy itself. This
Article addresses that void, developing a set of mid-level principles from
coordination theory and showing how these principles affect a wide range of
policy questions.
This analysis has a number of implications. For example, it has long been
thought that the coordination function requires granting broader patent rights
and doing so at an earlier point in time than the traditional rewards function.
Based on this assumption, many scholars have concluded that a coordination-
focused system would inevitably be more expensive than a rewards-focused
one. But upon closer examination, the coordination function could potentially
flourish with just the opposite policies-narrower patents granted later in
time-and so might actually be cheaper to implement. This illustrates the
importance of bringing coordination theory down to details. In many ways,
current patent law reflects the long-assumed constraints of rewards theory; a
move towards coordination goals opens a number of degrees of policymaking
freedom that have not been previously recognized. Moreover, coordination
theory can sometimes inform patent policymaking in cases where the
conventional rewards theory proves ambiguous, and so merits further
exploration regardless of whether coordination is ultimately accepted as a
principal justification for the patent system.
INTRODUCTION
For its first two centuries, the U.S. patent system had a mission that was
clear and well understood. Courts and commentators long agreed that the
purpose of offering patent protection was to reward invention.1 According to
this view, the patent system addresses a free-rider problem, subsidizing
activities that would otherwise occur below the socially optimal level. In this
way, the patent system is designed to effect a kind of decentralized tax-and-
spend policy, with consumers bearing higher prices so that inventors may be
compensated for inventive contributions they would not otherwise have
adequate incentives to make.2
1 See WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND EcoNoMIc
APPRAisAL 2-3 (1973); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDusTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 621-24 (3d ed. 1990) (giving a standard rewards-based
explanation as the logic of patent protection); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust
Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1813, 1817, 1821-22 (1984) (same).
2 See Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO.
L.J. 637, 638 (2013).
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In recent years, this consensus has broken. Scholars have since observed a
variety of purposes the patent system may serve beyond simply rewarding
inventive accomplishment.3 For example, commentators have suggested that
patents may play an important role in reducing transaction costs around
information, allowing for more open communication, mitigating the need for
trade secret protection, and facilitating technology transfer.
4 Expanding this
theory slightly, they have also noted that patents can be used to encourage
public disclosure, reduce the costs of identifying potential collaborators, and
enable smoother intra- and inter-firm cooperation.
5 Picking up on this theme of
collaboration, another group of commentators has investigated the role that
patents may play in the formation, operation, and dissolution of joint 
ventures.6
This emerging work suggests that a view of patents as merely rewards for
invention may oversimplify their function in facilitating the development of
3 The movement to explore alternative uses of the patent system can be traced to the
groundbreaking article by Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 277-79 (1977). A number of scholars building on (and in some
cases rebutting) Kitch's work have prompted renewed interest in these alternative theories in
the last decade or so. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71
U. CH. L. REv. 439 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for
Intellectual Property, 71 U. CH. L. REV. 129 (2004).
4 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 328-30 (2003); Nancy T. Gallini & Ralph A. Winter,
Licensing in the Theory of Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 237, 238, 241 (1985); Paul J.
Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 488-89, 497 (2005)
[hereinafter Heald, Transaction Costs Theory]; Paul J. Heald, Transaction Costs and Patent
Reform, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 447, 457 (2007); Julien P~nin,
Patents Versus Ex Post Rewards: A New Look, 34 RES. POL'Y 641, 649 (2005) (discussing
the role of patents in technology transfer).
5 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 329; Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges,
Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP.
CHANGE 451, 468-70 (2004); Colleen V. Chien, Opening the Patent System: Diffusionary
Levers in Patent Law, 89 S. CAL. L. REv. 793, 835-39 (2016); Heald, Transaction Costs
Theory, supra note 4, at 475 nn.15-16; Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic
Theories About the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. EcON. ISSUES 1031, 1039 (1998);
Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477,
1487-90 (2005); Julien Pdnin, Patent Policy: A Need to Focus on Both Appropriation and
Coordination Failure, 16 EuR. J. ECON. & Soc. SyS. 109, 111 (2003) ("[P]atents could be
used to solve both the appropriation and the coordination failure that appear within the
process of knowledge production.").
6 See William E. Kovacic, Intellectual Property Policy and Competition Policy, 66
N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 421, 424 (2011); Antoine Bureth et al., Patenting Practices
Within the Upper-Rhine Biovalley Network: Exclusion and Coordination Rationales 8-9
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new technology-that patents may also serve an important role in allowing
firms to coordinate their efforts after patenting has occurred.
This movement is controversial. Other commentators have questioned these
coordination-related justifications for patent rights, suggesting that the patent
system is ill-equipped to play these roles, is outmatched by superior
approaches to these problems, or is otherwise best left to its traditional
rewards-focused responsibilities.7 But a purely rewards-focused understanding
of the patent system has its challenges as well.8 As others have noted, there are
a variety of nonpatent alternatives that may be able to solve rewards problems
as well as (or even better than) the patent system.9 Perhaps for this reason, a
growing group of commentators now invoke theories related to coordination
when seeking to explain or justify our patent laws.10
Despite extensive discussion about the legitimacy of these coordination
roles for the patent system, very little has been said about the consequences of
this debate for patent policy itself. The incongruity is often striking. For
example, in their much-cited book, The Economic Structure of Intellectual
Property Law, William Landes and Richard Posner conclude that the strongest
arguments for the patent system have nothing to do with the traditional story
about rewarding invention, instead justifying the system with theories that fall
7 See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual Property,
91 TEx. L. REv. 227, 246-47, 262 (2012); Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent
Licensing Demands Mean Innovation?, 101 IowA L. REv. 137, 139 (2015); Mark A. Lemley,
The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REv. 709, 748 (2012); Liza S. Vertinsky,
Making Room for Cooperative Innovation, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1067, 1094-1102 (2014)
(arguing that prolific patent rights can inhibit cooperation).
8 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 326-27; Heald, Transaction Costs Theory,
supra note 4, at 474-75, 499-503; F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual
Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access,
56 EMORY L.J. 327, 401-04 (2006); Pdnin, supra note 5, at 117-19 (summarizing objections
to the traditional rewards account); Bureth et al., supra note 6, at 5-6 (summarizing prior
empirical work); Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Patent Protection: Policy Implications
from the Literature 4, 17-22 (Oct. 30, 2003) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=467489 [https://perma.cc/D9R3-8SEF].
9 See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
1o See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 328 (arguing that, without patents, firms
would invest more resources in preserving secrecy); Heald, Transaction Costs Theory,
supra note 4, at 486-91; Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A
Transactional Model, 45 Hous. L. REv. 1165, 1170 (2008) (suggesting that the "primary
function" of patent law "is to create a property right that reduces the cost of contracting
between inventive firms and firms needing inventions"); Kitch, supra note 3, at 276; Oskar
Liivak, Maturing Patent Theory from Industrial Policy to Intellectual Property, 86 TUL. L.
REv. 1163, 1179 (2012); Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 5, at 1037-38; Merges, supra note
5, at 1487-90; Pnin, supra note 5, at 110-11.
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soundly within the coordination function."
l But just a few pages later they
conclude that these justifications-while "compelling in the aggregate"-tell
them nothing about what patent policy should actually look like.
12 And this
admission is indicative of a much larger problem. Although a number of
scholars have embraced an entirely different justification for the patent system
than the one that has been assumed for over two hundred years, no one has
thoroughly examined the consequences of this shift in purported mission.
13
Instead, commentators have simply assumed that coordination-focused policy
would look exactly the same as rewards-focused policy, or that, if there were
any differences, coordination policy would require awarding earlier, broader
patent grants.14 As a result, the debate about these novel justifications for the
patent system has proceeded without a well-developed understanding of what
would be required for the patent system to serve these roles effectively.'
5
Part of the reason the coordination function is not better understood is that
commentators have not always agreed on what the term means.'
6 Without a
stable definition, the coordination function unsurprisingly lacks a unifying,
fully developed theory, which has in turn made it very difficult to determine
what coordination-focused patent policy would actually entail. To these ends,
this Article synthesizes a number of the various theories sometimes associated
with coordination into a specific, unified account. In short, the coordination
function includes any voluntary exchange of technical information made in
reliance on the exclusive rights of patents-a definition that embraces many,
but importantly not all, of the uses of the patent system that are sometimes
"1 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 326-30. An extensive discussion of what this
Article means by "coordination function" is included in Part II.
12 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 330-3 1.
13 Indeed, the most extensive investigation of the policy implications of these theories
seems to be found in the 1977 article that first postulated them. See Kitch, supra note 3, at
280-89. More recently, Paul Heald has explored the consequences of a transactional focus
for patent remedies. See Heald, supra note 10, at 1172-74. Colleen Chien offers several
proposals intended to encourage information sharing, but she does not develop the policy
implications of coordination theory itself. See Chien, supra note 5, at 855-62.
14 See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRIsIs AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 80-81 (2009) (noting that coordination goals are typically associated with a policy
of granting broad patents conferring "almost total control"); Burstein, supra note 7, at 245-
46, 278 (observing that the coordination rationale supports the argument that "intellectual
property should be granted early in the innovation process and should be broad and strong").
This view can be traced to the early days of coordination theory, see Kitch, supra note 3, at
280-89, but is long overdue for reevaluation, see infra Sections IV.B & IV.C.
15 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 330-31 (discussing the need for further
development of the policy implications of coordination theory); Nnin, supra note 5, at 125
(same).
16 See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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associated with coordination.17 This Article then develops this core theory into
a set of mid-level principles, and shows how these principles implicate a large
number of important policy questions.18 The result is the first comprehensive
analysis of how patent law would need to adapt if coordination goals were to
be accepted as a primary purpose of the patent system.
A reasonable skeptic might ask whether any of this actually matters. After
all, if either rewards theory or coordination theory leads to a system of"strong" patent rights, what really is the difference? But, as this Article will
show, one's answer to the question of "why have a patent system?" has
substantial and far-reaching consequences for a wide array of second-order
questions. Upon reflection, this should not come as a surprise: the rewards and
coordination functions solve different problems. They have quite different
theories of operation, which in turn lead to divergent intermediate principles of
what the patent system should offer patent holders. For example, the rewards-
versus-coordination debate has significant consequences for the ideal stability
of patent grants, the reliability of the right to exclude, and the optimal breadth
of patent protection. These mid-level values in turn implicate a wide range of
policy levers, such as the amount of scrutiny given to patent applications,'9 the
scope of patent claims,20 the timing of patent grants,21 the degree of deference
paid to the patent office once a patent has issued,22 and the antitrust analysis
applied to mergers of competing patent portfolios.23
These policy implications fill a critical void in the ongoing debate about the
desirability of using the patent system to facilitate coordination at all. Both the
rewards function and the coordination function have substitutes outside the
patent system-grants, prizes, and tax credits in the case of the rewards
function,24 more rigorous enforcement of contractual restraints and trade
secrets in the case of the coordination function.2 5 By shedding light on the
relationship between the coordination function's mission and the specifics of
its implementation, this Article contributes to the greater debate about the
'7 See infra Part II.
18 See infra Parts HI & IV.
19 See infra Section IV.A.
20 See infra Section JV.B.
21 See infra Section IV.C.
22 See infra Section IV.A.
23 See infra Section 1V.B.
24 See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate,
92 TEx. L. REv. 303, 307, 311-12 (2013); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of
Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DuKE L.J. 1693, 1719-24 (2008).
25 See Heald, Transaction Costs Theory, supra note 4, at 476; Mark A. Lemley, The




advantages and disadvantages of addressing these goals with the patent system
as compared to nonpatent alternatives.
Moreover, a closer examination of the coordination function yields insights
that remain salient even if coordination is ultimately rejected as a principal
justification for the patent system. In the event the rewards function retains its
seat as the dominant reason for having a patent system, the coordination
function may nonetheless serve as an important second-order consideration. As
this Article will show, one benefit of coordination theory is that it sometimes
provides guidance in situations where the implications of rewards theory prove
ambiguous. Thus, a deeper understanding of the coordination function may
assist rewards-focused policymaking as well, providing tie-breaking factors
and marginal benefits without sacrificing the primacy of rewards goals.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the rewards function of
the patent system and the traditional approaches to patent policy that have
followed therefrom. Part II discusses several coordination-related
understandings of the patent system and defines the coordination function for
purposes of this Article. Part III explores the theory of how patents can
facilitate coordination in greater detail and identifies several features of the
patent system that will have a significant influence on the coordination
function's effectiveness. Part 1V applies the results of Part III to a number of
topics in patent law and explains how these questions would need to be
evaluated differently for a patent system increasingly focused on coordination
as opposed to rewards.
I. THE TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATION: REWARDING INVENTION
A. Theoretical Foundations
According to the traditional rewards theory, the purpose of the patent system
is to incentivize invention through the promise of a regulatory bequest of
market power.26 In exchange for producing some socially useful invention, the
inventor is given a time-limited exclusive right to her creation. In principle,
that exclusive right vests its holder with some market power, which in turn
transfers wealth back to the inventor. At the same time, the exercise of this
market power results in some deadweight loss, which is to be accepted--or
not-as the cost of rewarding inventive activity through a system of exclusive
rights.
27
26 See Hahn, supra note 8, at 5-7 (summarizing the traditional rewards theory).
Mazzoleni and Nelson refer to this theory as the "invention motivation" theory. See
Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 5, at 1033, 1035.
27 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INvENTIvE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609, 619 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res. ed., 1962); Pdnin, supra note 5, at 113.
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In this view, by offering an incentive to invent, the patent system addresses
a classic free-rider problem. Without some form of regulatory intervention, an
inventor would be unable to appropriate enough of the benefits of her
invention to recoup the cost of making it, leading to the under-production of
inventions generally.28 The goal of the rewards function is to correct this
potential market failure by enabling inventors to appropriate more of the
benefits of their new technologies.
29
Traditionally, rewards theory was focused on incentivizing the earliest
stages of invention.30 Commentators have since expanded on this original
rewards theory, noting that patents may also incentivize continued investment
in technologies after patent rights have been obtained. Many technologies
require significant investment to go from proof of concept to being widely
available on the market.31 As with the initial inventive steps, an inventor may
hesitate to invest in the later stages of this process given the ease with which
her competitors could appropriate the benefits of that investment.32 Under this
commercialization incentives theory, in addition to any rewards a patent may
provide to perform the initial step of invention, a patent may also enable an
inventor to realize greater returns from investing in commercialization and
other post-patenting refinements.33
Rewarding invention or commercialization with a system of exclusive rights
has costs. First there is the administrative overhead of operating a patent
system-the time and expense of filing patent applications, examining them,
28 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 294; Kitch, supra note 3, at 266; Pdnin, supra
note 5, at 111-12; Pdnin, supra note 4, at 643; Hahn, supra note 8, at 8-9.
29 See BOWMAN, supra note 1, at 2-3; Pnin, supra note 4, at 645-55; Hahn, supra note 8,
at 7-8.
30 See Ted Sichelnan, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REv. 341, 357-59 (2010).
31 See id. at 348-54.
32 See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 5, at 1041; Sichelman, supra note 30, at 353-54,
372-74.
13 See Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92
CORNELL L. REv. 1065, 1067 (2007); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REv. 697, 707-10 (2001); Kitch, supra note 3, at
276. As others have noted, the observation that patents may provide incentives to
commercialize does not so much change the basic model of patents as rewards, but rather
expands the scope of what kinds of activity they can be used to reward. See Burstein, supra
note 7, at 241; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. CI-n. L. REv. 1017, 1037 (1989); Liivak, supra note 10, at
1168-69; Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 5, at 1033, 1040. Nonetheless, the two rewards
theories should not be equated, as the goal of rewarding invention might lead to very
different policies than the goal of rewarding commercialization. This Article focuses on the
consequences of a move towards coordination theory; the policy implications of the
commercialization-rewards theory are left for another day.
1572 [Vol. 96:1565
COORDINATION-FOCUSED PATENT POLICY
litigating patent disputes, and so on.34 Then there are the costs imposed by the
exclusives rights themselves: deadweight losses as a result of the inventor's
market power, impaired incentives for future researchers to improve the
patented technology, artificial pressure for competitors to design around the
patents, and so on.35 For the rewards function to justify having a patent system,
the social benefits of transferring wealth to innovators must exceed the
administrative costs, deadweight losses, and dynamic harms that come as a
result.
36
As others have noted, there are a variety of policy alternatives that could
provide similar incentives to inventors and commercializers: government
grants, tax deductions, publicly and privately administered prizes, indirect
subsidies for research, to name a few.37 The traditionally recognized advantage
of the patent system over these alternatives is its administrative simplicity.
38
Rather than trying to place a dollar value on any given contribution, the patent
office simply grants exclusive rights commensurate with the inventor's
achievement and allows the market to sort out what those rights are actually
worth.
39
31 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1064 (2005).
35 See Pnin, supra note 4, at 643-44. For a number of references discussing the dynamic
costs of awarding exclusive rights, see infra note 50.
36 See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1822; see also SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND
INCENTIVES 98-103 (2004).
37 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 24, at 311-12; Camilla A. Hrdy,
Commercialization Awards, 2015 Wis. L. REV. 13, 20-21; Pnin, supra note 5, at 111-12.
38 See ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 82-83 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978);
Pdnin, supra note 5, at 112-13. More recently, scholars have questioned whether the benefits
of this administrative simplicity outweigh the disadvantages of rewarding invention through
a system of exclusive rights. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56
VAND. L. REV. 115, 122-23 (2003); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards
Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECoN. 525, 539 (2001).
39 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 36, at 38-40 (discussing the comparative benefits of
patents and prizes). The observation that patents can create incentives both to invent and to
commercialize reveals one potential advantage of patents over other forms of direct rewards.
Once commercialization incentives are considered, patents look like a one-step
governmental intervention that goes a long way, both rewarding the initial invention and
allowing the inventor to capture additional benefits following from continued investment in
the technology. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Achieving the same benefits
through a system of prizes, by contrast, could require successive rounds of administrative
action. However, some scholars have argued that the existing system of early-stage patent
grants does not create sufficient incentives to see an invention through to
commercialization, suggesting that an additional, second-stage patent grant or extension
may in some circumstances be beneficial. See Abramowicz, supra note 33, at 1110-14;
Sichelman, supra note 30, at 400-11; see also Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010
15732016]
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Alternative reward mechanisms have analogous costs and benefits. For
example, a system of governmentally administered cash prizes could instead be
used to transfer wealth to inventors, but it would also impose administrative
costs in the form of time and expense preparing prize applications, soliciting
expert opinions, reviewing applications, and distributing rewards.40 These
grants would also cause deadweight losses as a result of the taxes necessary to
fund the grants.41 Whether the patent system or a prize system can achieve the
desired level of wealth transfer at lower cost is a subject of much debate, and
may very well depend on the time and circumstances of a particular project.
Importantly, as far as the objective of rewarding invention or
commercialization is concerned, the choice between a patent system and a
prize system is merely one of cost-effectiveness.42 If prizes or another form of
direct public funding could create the same incentives to invent with lower
administrative costs, smaller deadweight losses, and less significant dynamic
harms, the patent system could (and should) be replaced by the alternative
regime.43 And, in fact, in the United States today it appears invention and
commercialization are incentivized through a combination of patents, prizes,
and other forms of government subsidy.44
B. Patent Policy Under a Rewards-Focused Patent System
The design of a rewards-focused patent system takes place in the shadow of
the costs and benefits described in Section I.A. Increasing patent term,
broadening patent rights, and granting patentee antitrust immunities will all
tend to increase the expected wealth transfer to successful inventors and
commercializers, while also tending to impose additional deadweight losses.45
In the other direction, changes in policies that limit the rights of patent holders
will decrease their expected wealth transfer, while also reducing deadweight
losses. In the standard rewards view, all of these rights and liabilities are
essentially tradable; what one policy takes away, another policy can typically
give back.46
BYU L. REv. 1195, 1248-50 (explaining that this problem could be addressed by increasing
the threshold of patentability). Others have questioned the need to use the patent system to
provide commercialization incentives in the first place. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 7, at
739-45.
40 See Abramowicz, supra note 38, at 206-11; Hemel & Oullette, supra note 24, at 361-
62; Nnin, supra note 4, at 644-45.
41 See Abramowicz, supra note 38, at 201-06; Hemel & Oullette, supra note 24, at 314.
42 See Pnin, supra note 4, at 645-46.
43 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 24, at 312-15; Kieff, supra note 33, at 710;
Sichelman, supra note 30, at 358-59.
44 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 24, at 315-26.
41 See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1830-33.
4 See id.; see also SCOTCHMER, supra note 36, at 107, 109-11; Richard Gilbert & Carl
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In this way, there is a basic fungibility among patent policies in a rewards-
focused system. A new antitrust immunity is theoretically interchangeable with
a patent term extension--each will increase inventor rewards and impose
deadweight losses.47 As between the two, (and holding all else equal) the better
policy is the one that provides the larger private reward at lower public cost.
48
As a result, a policymaker might be able to improve the patent system by
drastically reducing patentee antitrust immunities and increasing patent term
(or vice versa). Thus, a wide range of patent policies-application filing fees,
patent term extensions, antitrust immunities, claim scope, and so on-
implicate essentially the same balancing of the benefits of rewarding inventors
against the public costs of doing so, and can be substituted one for the other as
circumstances require.
49
However, the fact that policies are formally interchangeable does not imply
they are all equally desirable. As others have noted, some patent policies will
be more or less likely to lead to undesirable levels of racing, vary in terms of
the specific kinds of invention they reward, or have different consequences for
incentives to create the next generation of technological improvements.50 Still,
the essential task confronting the rewards-focused policymaker is assembling
the most cost-effective bundle of patent term, exclusive rights, and immunities
to incentivize the creation of new inventions.51 While some policy levers may
be more attractive than others, almost any policy change affecting the level of
inventor rewards can be offset by pulling a different policy lever somewhere
else.
II. DEFINING THE COORDINATION FUNCTION
For almost two centuries, the rewards function was the dominant-though
not exclusive52-justification for the patent system. In more recent years,
however, commentators have noted a variety of roles the patent system may
Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106, 106-07 (1990); Paul
Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113,
114-16 (1990).
47 See Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 271-72 (2009);
Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1855-67.
48 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 36, at 109-11; Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1855-67.
49 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 36, at 107, 109-11 (discussing the fungibility of patent
term and breadth).
50 See Abramowicz, supra note 33, at 1068-69; Nancy T. Gallini, Patent Policy and
Costly Imitation, 23 RAND J. ECON. 52, 53 (1992); Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1837-39
(exploring the possibility that inventors will value some forms of rewards more than others);
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 869-70 (1990).
51 See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1822.
52 The disclosure justification also has a storied provenance. See infra Section II.B. 1.
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serve beyond the transfer of wealth to inventors of new technologies. Much of
this literature has been motivated by a rather troubling empirical question:
Why do so many inventors apply for patents when so few patents turn out to
have much enforcement value? After all, fewer than 2% of issued patents are
ever involved in litigation, and commentators estimate that fewer than 5% of
patents are ever licensed for a royalty.53 Moreover, in many industries survey
respondents rank patents as less important than other strategies for recouping
their investment in innovation.54 The apparent inability of the traditional
rewards view to fully explain the extent of participation in the patent system
has thus led scholars to search more deeply for roles the patent system may be
serving in practice.
55
Because prior work examining alternative uses of the patent system has
often been focused on explaining the behavior of private actors, there has not
been much need to distinguish where one function of the patent system ends
and the other begins. Those participating in the patent system likely do so for a
blend of reasons, and a novel observation about how some actors use the patent
system hardly needs to be exclusive of any other theory.56 Further
complicating matters, many of these functions are commonly associated with
Edmund Kitch's landmark article, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System. Although Kitch suggested a number of ways that the patent system
13 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv.
1495, 1501, 1507 (2001).
4 See Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIvrrY 783, 816; Edwin Mansfield,
Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 180 (1986); Wesley M.
Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Marketing Firms Patent (or Not) 28 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552
[https://perma.cc/8XTT-TCZ5]. Apart from these studies focused on patentee behavior,
some scholars have questioned whether increasing patent value actually leads to more
innovation at a systemic level-further undermining the traditional rewards theory. See
Heald, Transaction Costs Theory, supra note 4, at 499-503 (summarizing this literature).
55 See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Cm. L. REv. 625, 626-27 (2002); Pnin,
supra note 4, at 642, 646-48. In addition to the coordination-related explanations described
below, there are a number of other plausible answers to this question. See, e.g., Stuart J.H.
Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063,
1064-70 (2008); Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox
Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995,
32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 125 (2001); Lemley, supra note 53, at 1504-06; Gideon
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2005).
56 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REv. 1575, 1615-30 (2003); Kitch, supra note 3, at 266; Long, supra note 55, at 637




could increase the output from resources used for technological innovation,
57
subsequent commentators have tended to discuss them all under the broad
rubric of "prospect theory," and have not consistently distinguished among the
various uses Kitch described.
58
As a starting point for this discussion, this Article offers a more specific
definition of the term "coordination function." As used in this Article,
"coordination function" refers to the voluntary exchange of technical
information made in reliance on the exclusive rights of patents. Several
theories of how the patent system can facilitate coordination fall squarely
within this definition, as explored in Section II.A. A few variants on these core
theories are not as easy to categorize, and require a bit of qualification in order
to determine whether they are or are not within the scope of the coordination
function. These "it depends" theories are discussed in Section II.B.
59
A. The Core of the Coordination Function
The theory at the heart of the coordination function is that patents may
reduce risk in transactions around technical information. Whenever a firm
shares information with value that depends on the firm's ability to control
future uses of that information, it puts some of that value at risk. The recipient
of the information may breach its promises, the information may turn out to be
valuable in some way not anticipated by the parties' original agreement, or a
third party may simply intercept the disclosure. As the theory goes, a patent's
in rem exclusivity-its ability to restrain others without needing to show a
contractual relationship or even a chain of direct copying--can mitigate the
57 See Kitch, supra note 3, at 265, 275-79.
58 See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 14, at 69-72; NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & ELI M.
SALZBERGER, THE LAW AND EcoNoMIcs OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL AGE:
THE LMITS OF ANALYSIS 83 (2013). Moreover, the term "prospect theory" is often used as
shorthand for the patent policies Kitch initially suggested these functions would imply. See
Abramowicz, supra note 33, at 1068; Duffy, supra note 3, at 440-43 (describing the
"prospect features" of patent law as "the rules permitting fairly broad patents to be issued in
the early stages of technical development"); Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith,
Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & EcON. 197, 197-98
(1980); Sichelman, supra note 30, at 345.
19 There are also a few theories that are sometimes associated with coordination but
which fall outside the scope of the definition given above. For example, the patent system
might play an important role in rewarding commercialization, but this rewards-based theory
is outside the scope of the coordination function as defined here. See infra note 102.
Likewise, some conceptions of signaling theory are also outside the scope of the
coordination function, for reasons explained in Section II.B.2. The definition given above is
relied upon throughout the following analysis; to be clear, adopting a different definition of
the coordination function could lead to sharply different conclusions about what
coordination-focused patent policy would entail.
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risks of sharing information with a counterparty, allowing for more efficient
development and exploitation of new technologies.
There are many potential benefits tied up in this idea of patents reducing the
risk of losing control over technical information. Perhaps the simplest is that
having patent protection as a fallback may reduce the costs of keeping secrets
within a firm.60 A strong patent portfolio may mitigate the risks and costs of
misappropriation of confidential information, reducing the need for
confidentiality agreements, physical protections, and intra-firm segregation.6 1
Patents may also reduce the perils encountered when transferring information
outside the firm.62 Without some kind of legal backstop, it can be quite
difficult to bargain and trade for a secret. In some cases-though certainly not
a1163-it is impossible to set the price for information without knowing what
the information is, and of course a buyer may not be willing to pay anything at
all once she has been given the information in question.64 Although in some
cases contractual mechanisms can mitigate this problem, the seller nonetheless
faces the risk that valuable information may be inadvertently transferred
without compensation during the negotiations period.65 Patents may be able to
provide an alternate source of protection around transactions, and thus
facilitate the negotiated transfer of information from one firm to another.66
60 See Heald, Transaction Costs Theory, supra note 4, at 487-89; Kitch, supra note 3, at
279.
61 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 328; Heald, Transaction Costs Theory, supra
note 4, at 488-89. As Dan Burk and Brett McDonnell have noted, the benefits of reduced
reliance on trade secrecy and other precautions can accrue to employer and employee alike.
See Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual
Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 575, 608-09. Relatedly, a
strong patent portfolio may obviate the need to steer development efforts towards particular
technologies or products for which secrecy is likely to be more effective. See LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 4, at 328; Kitch, supra note 3, at 279.
62 See Pdnin, supra note 4, at 649.
63 See Burstein, supra note 7, at 256-58 (describing various transactions that can occur
with little risk to secrecy-dependent value).
I This challenge is known as Arrow's Information Paradox. See Arrow, supra note 27,
at 614-16; see also James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, The Sale of Ideas: Strategic
Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting, 69 REv. EcON. STUD. 513, 514 (2002).
Because the nature of information varies, this issue is more serious in some types of
transactions than others. See Anton & Yao, supra, at 514-15; Burstein, supra note 7, at 274.
65 See Merges, supra note 5, at 1487-90; Janusz A. Ordover, A Patent System for Both
Diffusion and Exclusion, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 50 (1991).
66 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 329; Ashish Arora, Contracting for Tacit
Knowledge: The Provision of Technical Services in Technology Licensing Contracts, 50 J.
DEv. ECON. 233, 246-47 (1996) (observing bundling of patent licenses with complementary
know-how). Variants of this argument are sometimes categorized under the disclosure
function. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 33, at 1029-30. However, at other times the term
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But the potential risk-reducing benefits of patents are not limited to
transactions for the sale of technical information itself. It can also be quite
difficult to arrange for services to be performed that merely require the use of
confidential information.67 Because of the challenges of contracting around
information, possessors of valuable nonpublic knowledge may abstain from
otherwise mutually beneficial transactions for fear of losing control of how that
knowledge will be used in the future. For example, it may be difficult for a
firm to obtain financing when the firm's prospective value depends heavily on
the secrecy of its information. Similarly, a firm contemplating outsourcing
some aspects of production or design may hesitate to do so, given the risk that
proprietary information will be misused by its counterparty. A strong patent
portfolio on the underlying technology may allow the firm to disclose specific
plans based on that technology more widely, enabling greater transparency
with investors, more effective outsourcing, and earlier engagement with
potential partners and customers.
68
Another way patents may facilitate collaboration is by making it easier to
form and resolve joint ventures. One of the well-known risks of joining a
research partnership is that the collaboration may result in the inadvertent
transfer of existing information from a firm to its partners.
69 Patents can be
used to define and protect the technology that each party possessed prior to the
partnership, reducing the risk of misappropriation or opportunistic behavior by
collaborators.70 On the other end of the joint venture lifecycle, patents may
simplify the process of dividing the fruits of the partnership, allowing the
parties to contract for future control of technology that did not exist at the time
the collaboration began.
71
"disclosure" is used to refer to functions that are distinct from coordination. See infra
Section II.B. I.
67 See Kitch, supra note 3, at 277.
68 See id. at 277-78; see also Heald, Transaction Costs Theory, supra note 4, at 497-98;
P~nin, supra note 4, at 650. For discussions of the relationship between transaction costs
and vertical integration, see Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian,
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L.
& EcoN. 297, 298 (1978); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of
Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1570, 1573-74 (1995). For
discussions of similar benefits in the context of trade secrecy, see Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485-87 (1974) (describing how trade secret protection can
facilitate licensing and dissemination); Lemley, supra note 25, at 335-36 (describing how
trade secret protection can serve as a partial solution to Arrow's Information Paradox).
69 See Bureth et al., supra note 6, at 8-9; Merges, supra note 68, at 1582-83; Ordover,
supra note 65, at 55-56; Pdnin, supra note 5, at 124.
70 See Arora & Merges, supra note 5, at 458-59; Pdnin, supra note 5, at 124; Pdnin,
supra note 4, at 650.
71 See Bureth et al., supra note 6, at 8-9, 17-18.
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In many of these roles, patents are essentially providing a solution to the
various problems with using contracts to arrange transactions around
information. For a host of reasons-the difficulties of describing information
precisely, evidentiary uncertainty, and the limitations of contractual remedies,
to name a few72-it may be challenging to mitigate these risks by mutual
agreement. This is not to say it would be impossible to conduct any
transactions at all in the absence of patent protection-there are clearly some
transactions that will occur either way.73 The theory, rather, is that a
framework of exclusive rights can reduce the risks involved in evaluating,
entering, and enforcing agreements involving the exchange of information.74
Patents may also be useful for facilitating information sharing in contexts
where contracting is simply not an option.75 For example, if a firm wants to
make a broad announcement about an important technical development in
hopes of identifying potential partners, it may not be possible to contract with
all the relevant recipients to establish the terms of that disclosure-particularly
if the very reason for the announcement is to discover previously unknown
candidates for collaboration. Similarly, if hundreds of competitors want to
collaborate to develop a new industry standard, it may not be practical to
contractually settle exactly who owns which technologies before getting down
to the standard-setting work itself. A background of exclusive rights, the theory
goes, may allow for smoother multilateral exchanges of information, reducing
duplicative efforts, opening the development process to outside collaborators,
and enabling innovations that no firm would be able to achieve on its own.76
All of these theories-as varied and far-reaching as they are-boil down to
a simple idea: patents may be able to facilitate the voluntary exchange of
technical information in the shadow of their exclusive rights. In some cases,
the voluntary exchange is for the patented invention itself-that is, the
technology described in the patent specification that justified the patent grant
72 See Heald, Transaction Costs Theory, supra note 4, at 480-81; Edmund W. Kitch, The
Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 683, 690-93
(1980); Kitch, supra note 3, at 278; Merges, supra note 5, at 1491-93, 1497-98, 1503-04.
73 See Burstein, supra note 7, at 256-57.
74 See Merges, supra note 5, at 1484-85; Merges, supra note 68, at 1589-91; P6nin, supra
note 5, at 124; Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An
Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 129-30 (2010).
75 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 19 (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/lO/innovationrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/3 89B-KPGL]
[hereinafter FTC REPORT]; Bureth et al., supra note 6, at 7; Kitch, supra note 3, at 278;
Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 5, at 1039; Merges, supra note 5, at 1507-08; see also
Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEx. L. REV.
961, 993-96, 1013 (2005) (describing how patents can facilitate information sharing around
software).
76 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 329; Pnin, supra note 5, at 111.
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in the first place. In other cases, the exchanged information consists of
technical details that happen to fall within the scope of the patent's
exclusivity-not only potentially helpful know-how that was omitted from the
original disclosure, but also further developments that might have been made
well after the patent was filed.77 Either way, these theories contemplate the
voluntary exchange of technical information made in reliance on the exclusive
rights of patents, and thus fall unambiguously within the definition of the
coordination function.
B. Theories with an Element of Coordination
There are also several theories at the edge-uses of the patent system that
are in some sense within the coordination function and in some sense not. This
Section introduces these potentially ambiguous cases and discusses their
relationship to the core theory of the coordination function.
1. Disclosure
Of the various non-rewards justifications for the patent system, disclosure
has by far the longest history. The Supreme Court mentioned disclosure as a
goal of the patent system as early as 1832, and has repeatedly described
disclosure as a central component of the patent bargain, sometimes even as the
consideration offered by the patentee in exchange for exclusive 
rights.78
A complication to this storied legacy is that "disclosure" has at times been
invoked to mean two very different things. In one sense, the "disclosure
function" refers to the doctrinal requirement that a patent applicant include a
77 For a discussion of how patents may enable the transfer of complementary, secret
information, see Ashish Arora, Licensing Tacit Knowledge: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Market for Know-How, 4 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 41 (1995). Although in
theory a firm must choose between patent protection (which requires disclosure) and trade
secrecy (which forbids it), in practice this line is blurry, and many firms are able to "have it
both ways" by disclosing enough to get a patent while also keeping valuable, related
information as a trade secret. See Michael Risch, Trade Secret Law and Information
Development Incentives, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY 169 (Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011); Sichelman & Graham, supra note 74, at
136.
78 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) ("When a patent is
granted and the information contained in it is circulated to the general public and those
especially skilled in the trade, such additions to the general store of knowledge are of such
importance to the public weal that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price
of 17 years of exclusive use .. "); Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S.
327, 331 (1945) ("The primary purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual
but the advancement of the arts and sciences .... [I]t is not a certificate of merit, but an
incentive to disclose."); Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 247 (1832) (describing
disclosure as "the advantage for which the privilege [of patenting] is allowed, and ... the
foundation of the power to issue the patent").
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written description of her invention in such clear, concise, and exact terms as
to enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the invention.79 This is the
traditional understanding of the patent system's role in increasing disclosure-
the disclosure legally required in a patent application as part of the quid pro
quo of a patent grant.80 Under this understanding of disclosure, the success or
failure of the patent system turns on what is in patent applications
themselves.81 However, in other contexts, the term "disclosure function" can
refer to the patent system's ability to facilitate information transfer more
broadly.82 As the theory goes, a system of in rem exclusive rights may
encourage publication and exchange of technical information that an owner
would otherwise have needed to keep confidential to preserve its value.83 In
this understanding of disclosure, the measure of the patent system's success
turns not necessarily on the quality of the disclosure contained in patent
applications, but rather on the ease and frequency with which patent holders
share information with the public or others in their industry as a result of
having patent protection in place.84
Thus there are two distinct concepts joined together under the rubric of
disclosure: one in which the patent system is disclosure-forcing, and another in
which the patent system is disclosure-facilitating.85 And these two concepts are
rooted in quite different theories about the problem to be solved by the patent
system. The disclosure-forcing argument for patenting is based on a concern
that, in the absence of patents, secrecy would give inventors de facto exclusive
79 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
80 See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 5, at 1039. To be sure, these doctrinal
requirements have a role to play in a rewards-focused framework as well. For example, the
enablement and written description requirements work to limit and demarcate claim scope,
thus ensuring that an inventor does not obtain protection for things she has not actually
invented, and increasing the certainty of claim boundaries. See Timothy R. Holbrook,
Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REv. 123, 146-47, 157-58 (2006). The traditional
disclosure theory goes even further, elevating these requirements to a justification for
granting patents in the first place.
81 See C. T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM:
A STUDY OF THE BRrnISH EXPERIENCE 210-13 (1973); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents
Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 545, 557-59 (2012); Jason Rantanen,
Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 5 (2012); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching
Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv 621, 623-27 (2010); Note, The Disclosure
Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereo), 118 HARv. L. REv. 2007, 2014 (2005).
82 Pdnin, supra note 4, at 651; see also Clark D. Asay, The Informational Value of
Patents, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 259, 264-66 (2016) (distinguishing between disclosure
requirements and signaling functions).
83 See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 5, at 1039-40.
" See FTC REPORT, supra note 75, at 19; Burk & McDonnell, supra note 61, at 610;
Lemley, supra note 7, at 745-49.
81 See Rantanen, supra note 81, at 6-7 (making a similar distinction).
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control over their inventions for an indefinite period of time.
86 From this
perspective, it is preferable to give inventors time-limited exclusive rights
rather than to let them keep their secrets forever. The idea is that the
requirements of patent law will prompt possessors of valuable nonpublic
information to make disclosures in patent applications instead of simply
relying on secrecy.87 As a result, this theory lacks a voluntary disclosure of
technical information made in reliance on patent-based exclusivity, and falls
outside the scope of the coordination function. The disclosure-facilitating
argument for patenting, by contrast, is focused on the concern that, in the
absence of patents, the risk of losing control over useful technical information
would force firms to maintain this information as a secret notwithstanding
existing reasons for those firms to share it with others. The goal of facilitating
disclosure is not to artificially encourage disclosure for its own sake, but rather
to enable the exchange of information when it is already privately desirable to
do so.88 Reduced to this description, the disclosure-facilitating justification for
the patent system falls squarely within the coordination function, since it




Another function that the patent system may serve is signaling. However, as
with disclosure, the term "signaling" actually refers to several distinct
concepts, some of which fall within the coordination function and some of
which do not. As a result, discussion of patent "signaling" requires further
86 As others have noted, this fear may be unfounded. Secrets are vulnerable to
independent invention and reverse engineering. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 25, at 330.
Some inventions are "self-disclosing," meaning that secrecy would end as soon as a product
hit the market. See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use
and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 81, 104-06.
87 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154-56 (1989);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-92 (1974). A number of commentators
have questioned whether the goal of forcing disclosure can justify the costs of the patent
system. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 33, at 1028-30; Sichelman, supra note 30, at 377-
78. As a result, the more common view is to explain the disclosure requirements as a
rational policy choice in view of other theories that justify the patent system. See, e.g.,
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REv. 539, 548-49 (2009); Lemley, supra
note 25, at 332 & n.87; Ouellette, supra note 81, at 557.
88 See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 5, at 1039; Rantanen, supra note 81, at 20.
89 Cf Rantanen, supra note 81, at 36. This divergence only underscores the need for
greater clarity about what is meant by "disclosure." Ambiguous use of the term unhelpfully
conjoins two distinct theories of the patent system, and thus leads to indeterminate or
conflicting implications for patent policy. See id. at 39-40 (contrasting these two
understandings of disclosure theory).
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elaboration before one can confidently classify it as being within the
coordination function or outside it.
One understanding of signaling is rooted in the challenges outsiders face in
verifying information about a firm's capacities for research and development.
For example, two firms may both claim to be leaders in the same field, making
it difficult for investors, potential employees, and partners to identify which is
actually the better prospect. According to this theory, a firm can signal its
strength by investing in patents.90 As between the two firms claiming to be
leaders in their field, the one with stronger research and development
capabilities will find it profitable to file more applications, and over time will
tend to be awarded more patents.91
Notably, this first version of signaling theory does not rely on the ability to
exclude others from using any particular technology.92 Rather, the signaling
function operates based on a perceived correlation between a firm's ability to
obtain patents and other, more-difficult-to-observe characteristics of the firm.93
If this form of signaling were the only function of the patent system,94 there
would be no need to offer exclusive rights at all-the challenges of verifying
technical achievement could be addressed by a merit recognition system
wholly apart from patents.95 And, because this version of the signaling theory
does not depend on the exclusive rights conveyed by a patent to enable the
transfer of technical information, it falls outside the definition of the
coordination function.
However, there is another understanding of signaling that complicates the
story. This alternate signaling theory is rooted in the difficulties a firm may
face when it comes to identifying potential partners for the development of a
nascent technology. Unlike real property, where it may be easy to observe
what neighbors are doing, researchers in a technical field may be unaware of
90 See Long, supra note 55, at 636-37; Jessica Silbey, Patent Variation: Discerning
Diversity Among Patent Functions, 45 LOY. U. CHn. L.J. 441,458-60 (2013).
91 See Long, supra note 55, at 650, 667. Long additionally suggested that information
contained in patent applications may be more reliable than other sources because applicants
are subject to a duty of candor in patent proceedings. Id. at 649-50.
92 See id. at 636-37.
93 Id.
94 To be clear, however, this is not a claim that proponents of the signaling theory
generally make. See, e.g., id. at 637. For a discussion of the interplay between exclusive
rights and the signaling function of patents, see Mann, supra note 75, at 1022.
9' For example, significant technical or academic accomplishments could be recognized
by a system of prestigious prizes or peer-selected honors. See, e.g., INT'L MATHEMATICAL
UNION, FIELDS MEDAL DETAILS, http://www.mathunion.org/general/prizes/fields/details/
[https://perma.cc/2QYT-4TBQ] (last visited July 11, 2016); NOBEL MEDIA AB,
NOBELPRIZE.ORG: THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE NOBEL PRIZE, http://www.nobelprize.org




potential collaborators performing similar work. This can lead to duplicative
investment, increased search costs, and incompatible technologies.
96 A
publicly recorded patent right, the theory goes, may provide a "beacon" to
others in the industry, allowing potential partners to find each other and
cooperate at an earlier stage of the development cycle.
97
The proper classification of this latter signaling theory turns on the
following question: Why exactly do private firms need a government-issued
patent right in order to find each other? If the answer is that firms need help
identifying competent partners in a particular technology area,
98 then this latter
form of signaling is no different than the former-both are rooted in the
problem of conveying information credibly, and both could be addressed
without legal rights to exclude. But if the answer is that, without exclusive
rights, it would be too risky for firms to share the information necessary to find
(and be found by) potential partners, then this latter form of signaling is
effectively a restatement of the core disclosure-facilitating theory described in
Section II.B. 1.
So while both of these signaling theories relate to more efficient exchange
of information, they appear to be rooted in quite different stories of market
failure. If "signaling" refers to the challenges of conveying information
credibly, then patents are but one form of prize that could be used to identify
technical competence. But if "signaling" refers to the difficulty of disclosing
information without losing control over it, then the exclusive rights of the
patent system are essential to addressing the problem. The latter is within the
coordination function, the former is not.99
To summarize, three general theories discussed by commentators fall within
the definition of the coordination function: (1) patents can reduce risk in
96 See Kitch, supra note 3, at 278-79.
" See id.; see also Kieff, supra note 8, at 414; F. Scott Kieff, IP Transactions: On the
Theory & Practice of Commercializing Innovation, 42 Hous. L. REv. 727, 735 (2005).
'8 See, e.g., Bureth et al., supra note 6, at 8.
99 It may seem counterintuitive that some forms of signaling are within the coordination
function while others are not. But the two signaling theories describe the significance of
patent exclusivity in starkly different terms. The core contribution of the first signaling
theory is that the value promised to successful inventors may come from sources other than
a patent's legal right to exclude. See, e.g., Long, supra note 55, at 636-37 ("The patentee
may desire information disclosure, even if the value of the exclusive rights (protection)
obtained in exchange is zero."). By contrast, proponents of the latter signaling theory have
emphasized the critical importance of property-like rights to exclude. See, e.g., Kieff, supra
note 8, at 341 ("To achieve this [private ordering] role effectively, [patents] must operate as
rights of exclusion around which coordination can take place.").
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bilateral transactions around information; (2) patents can facilitate multilateral
collaboration; and, (3) patents can facilitate broader voluntary disclosure.
The various theories within the coordination function share a rather humble
charter: reducing costs and risks so that otherwise privately desirable
transactions can occur.100 This is in contrast to rewards-centric uses of the
patent system, which typically seek to stimulate some desired conduct through
the promise of something valuable.101 Rather than offering a public subsidy in
exchange for the desired conduct, the coordination function merely seeks to
facilitate output-enhancing interactions among private actors.102
It is worth noting that there is a basic tension at the heart of coordination
theory. Whereas rewards theory seeks to justify the static costs of patents based
on the dynamic benefits of rewarding invention in the long run,103 coordination
theory seeks to justify the static costs of patents by reducing other static
100 Implicit in coordination-related justifications for the patent system is the assumption
that these private exchanges yield public benefits. For a discussion of the social benefits of
sharing and exchange in the context of real property, and of how the threat of strategic
behavior can inhibit such sharing, see Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J.
857, 871-72 (2014).
'1o See supra Section II.A.
102 Some theories may straddle this distinction. For example, the suggestion that the
patent system plays an important role in facilitating commercialization appears to draw on
aspects of both the rewards and the coordination functions. Part of the claim is that patents
may reduce free riding and create incentives to invest in commercialization, which is at
heart a rewards theory. Another part of the claim is that patents may enable broader
disclosure and facilitate the transactions necessary to move early-stage technologies from
inventors to commercializers, which is at heart a coordination theory. See LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 4, at 329; Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 5, at 1040. For a dialogue
regarding this distinction, see Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Information with
Intellectual Property, 92 TEx. L. REV. SEE ALSO 35, 41 (2014); Michael J. Burstein, Reply-
Commercialization Without Exchange, 92 TEx. L. REV. SEE ALSO 45, 46 (2014). And some
theories may resist categorization as either rewards or coordination. For example, Kitch
famously argued that patents can reduce competition for innovation and that this reduction
in competition can actually lead to more efficient development of new technologies by
avoiding duplicative investments. See Kitch, supra note 3, at 276; see also SCOTCHMER,
supra note 36, at 152. But see Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L. REV. 989, 1048-58 (1997) (disputing the theory);
Merges & Nelson, supra note 50, at 872-74 (same). Unlike the rewards and coordination
theories, this idea is not rooted in the difficulties of excluding others from uses of
information at all. In fact, the generalized form of the supposed problem--overinvestment in
entry-can occur in situations having nothing to do with information or emerging
technologies. See Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright
Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 48-55 (2004) (describing an example of overinvestment
in the construction of gas stations).
103 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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costs.104 The potential for failure is real. Initiatives to grant more patents or to
make them stronger might reduce the costs of collaboration for some projects,
only to increase the costs of collaboration for other projects.
10 5 Thus, it is
neither obvious nor inevitable that the coordination function will succeed at all,
much less justify the full costs of having a patent system.
For these reasons and others, a number of commentators have argued that
the coordination function neither convincingly describes nor plausibly justifies
the patent system.106 However, their analysis has consistently relied on a
fundamental assumption that has not been very thoroughly examined: that a
coordination-focused patent system would operate more or less like the current
rewards-focused system. 107 The next Part explores coordination theory in more
detail to inform the question: What would a coordination-focused patent
system actually look like?
III. THE COORDINATION FuNCTION: FROM THEORY TO MID-LEVEL
PRINCIPLES
Part II surveyed a wide array of alternative uses of the patent system and
synthesized a core definition of the coordination function. But, as others have
noted, it is one thing to state these potential benefits of the patent system, and
another thing to understand what a coordination-focused patent system would
require to be effective.'0 8 This Part explores coordination theory in more detail
to identify the characteristics of the patent system that are important for
coordination and those that are not.
A. What Does the Coordination Function Require?
To understand what the coordination function requires to operate, it is first
necessary to establish what it would mean for the patent system to serve this
function well. As discussed in Part II, the goal of the coordination function is
to facilitate output-enhancing information exchange among private actors by
reducing the risk that exchanged information will later be used in ways its
104 And, of course, under either theory patents may impose dynamic costs as well. See
supra notes 35, 50 and accompanying text.
"05 See Fromer, supra note 87, at 551-52; Merges & Nelson, supra note 50, at 871-75;
Vertinsky, supra note 7, at 1068.
106 See, e.g., Burstein, supra note 7, at 246-47, 262; Feldman & Lemley, supra note 7, at
139; Lemley, supra note 7, at 748.
107 To the extent their analysis has contemplated differences between rewards- and
coordination-focused policies, commentators have typically associated a coordination-
focused system with patent rights that are broad, strong, and granted early. See, e.g., BURK
& LEMLEY, supra note 14, at 80-8 1; Burstein, supra note 7, at 245-46, 278.
108 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 330-31 (observing the need for more
development in this area); Pdnin, supra note 5, at 125 (same).
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original possessor did not intend.109 The theory is that a backdrop of exclusive
rights will allow firms with confidential information to reduce precautions and
share that information more freely when it is beneficial for them to do so. On
the theory's own terms, success is measured by the amount of privately
beneficial information sharing that occurs in reliance on patent rights.
So which characteristics of the patent system determine whether a lot or a
little patent-backed information sharing will occur? To answer this question,
consider the share-or-conceal decision from the perspective of a firm
possessing valuable technical information.110 The firm could obtain some
benefits by choosing to share this information.11' But those benefits are
counterbalanced by a risk that the information's value will be diminished
through a loss of future control.112 The essential question facing the firm is
whether the expected benefits of sharing this confidential information exceed
the expected loss that may occur from future unplanned use by others.
In a world without patents, the decision to share any particular piece of
information is a straightforward one. The firm must simply compare the
expected benefits of information sharing to the expected harms that could
result from losing control over that information. When the benefits of sharing
are large compared to the risk of loss, the firm will elect to share.113 For
example, the benefits of telling customers some general details about new
products likely far exceed the downside of competitors also learning the same
information. But when the benefits of sharing pale in comparison to what the
firm stands to lose, secrecy is the better path. For example, even if the firm
could make additional sales by showing customers its complete design
109 See supra Section II.A.
110 Throughout this discussion, the term "information sharing" is used to include both a
deliberate transfer of information and a reduction in precautions to prevent transfer. Each is
a decision by a firm to loosen its grip on some valuable information.
"I Call these benefits available from sharing the information B. Because the goal of
coordination theory is only to enable information exchange where there are already private
benefits to doing so, B is greater than 0 by hypothesis. If there are no private benefits to
sharing information (i.e., B < 0), then no information sharing will occur, and coordination
theory suggests no reason to try to alter this result.
112 Call the control-dependent value that can be lost through future misuse of the
information S, and the probability of that loss d. Sharing information thus gives the firm a
certain benefit B, but also an expected loss given by dS. As with the benefits of information
sharing, this expected loss is greater than 0 by hypothesis. If there are no risks of loss as a
result of information sharing (i.e., dS < 0), the firm will share the information regardless of
B and regardless of patent protection. It is the marginal cases-where private benefits are
available but are overshadowed by the risks that come along with disclosure-that the
coordination function seeks to affect.
113 The firm will engage in the information-sharing activity provided that the expected
benefits of the activity outweigh the expected risk of losing the information's control-
dependent value, that is, so long as B > dS.
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schematics, the risk of losing control over such information is usually too great
to justify this level of transparency.
1 14
The goal of the coordination function is to influence this balancing, allowing
the firm to engage in more privately beneficial information sharing than it
otherwise would. Patents do this, the theory goes, by reducing the expected
losses from engaging in information sharing. If a patent-holding firm elects to
share its confidential information and later discovers the information is being
used in a way it does not approve of, it can bring a patent suit to attempt to




this way, the expected loss the firm faces from sharing its information is
reduced, potentially allowing more privately beneficial information exchanges
to occur.
1 1 6
To illustrate, consider a firm that has just finished designing its latest
product. The firm could manufacture the product itself, or it could hire an
outside company to do it. In this hypothetical, outsourcing would allow the
firm to make each unit more cheaply, but require disclosing the firm's valuable
design plans to an outside party.117 This creates a risk that the plans may end
up in the hands of a competitor, destroying much of their value to the firm.
118
To a certain extent, the firm can seek to avoid this result by choosing an
outsourcing partner with a good reputation and putting strict nondisclosure
terms in the contract, but such precautions can only go so far. The expected
benefits of outsourcing come with some risk that the plans will be disclosed or
used in a way that harms the firm.
So the firm must weigh these expected risks and benefits. In the absence of
patents, the firm will outsource only if the expected benefits of doing so are
114 Holding the probability of loss d constant, the greater the control-dependent value at
risk S, the greater the benefit B necessary for information sharing to be worth the gamble.
15 Bringing a patent infringement suit against those using the previously confidential
information will impose a positive enforcement cost C, but offer a probability p of restoring
some amount of exclusivity value X So, whereas in the absence of patent protection
divulgence means a loss of the full amount of the original control-dependent value S, it will
now result in a loss of S + C, but will potentially be offset by patent-based exclusivity with
expected value pX.
116 In terms of the model, this fallback exclusion strategy allows the firm to share
information so long as B > d(S + C -pX). On certain conditions (discussed below), patents
can decrease the right side of that inequality, allowing more information-sharing
opportunities with benefits B to become worth their risks. Moreover, patent protection might
be able to reduce the likelihood that an unplanned use occurs at all-that is, it may decrease
d. For example, if the disclosing firm can reliably bring a patent suit against those who use
the disclosed information without the firm's permission, other parties may be deterred from
misappropriating the information in the first instance.
117 In this example, the benefits to the firm of outsourcing are B.
118 The probability that a competitor will obtain the plans is d, and the loss to the firm
from this occurring is S.
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large compared to the probability and magnitude of harm from unplanned
future use.1 19 But if the firm has the option of bringing a patent infringement
suit, it enjoys a chance of restoring some of the exclusivity value that might be
lost in the event of an unplanned use.120 This infringement-suit option can
reduce the downside risk that the firm faces when deciding whether or not to
share its information in the first place. As a result, the firm may find more
outsourcing opportunities worthwhile than it would in the absence of patent
protection.
121
Viewed from this perspective, the patent system's success in enabling
information sharing turns on the ability of patents to reliably restore a firm to
the position it would have enjoyed under secrecy. A maximally effective
(though not necessarily cost-justified) coordination-focused patent system
would give the firm a risk-free right to restore its prior exclusivity after
disclosure has occurred. This would allow a firm to have the best of two
worlds: it would receive all the benefits of disclosure and engagement with
others, while at the same time enjoying all the control and exclusivity value
afforded by secrecy. Such airtight patent rights, combined with powerful
remedies, would moot the share-versus-conceal question entirely, allowing
information sharing to occur whenever there is any benefit to doing so.1 22
When patent rights provide something less than that, their effect is to
reduce, rather than eliminate, the risk a firm faces when it elects to share its
information. Consider the possibility that the remedies provided by patent law
"' As in the generalized form of the model, the firm will only take this risk ifB > dS.
120 Specifically, the firm now faces a probability p of restoring X of the lost control value
through patent remedies.
121 The patent-holding firm will take the risk of sharing information when B > d(S + C -
pX). Because a firm without patents would already share information in cases where B >
dS, patents facilitate incremental information sharing only when d(S + C - pX) < dS, which
can be rewritten as pX> C. When that condition doesn't hold, the firm will simply ignore its
patent portfolio, and make its information-sharing decisions as it would in the absence of
patents. Note that the relevant decision the coordination function seeks to influence is the
decision to share or withhold information in the shadow of patent rights, not the decision to
acquire patents or to enforce them. Even in a coordination-focused system, firms with
patents may sometimes find it profitable to sue independent adopters who did not actually
acquire the technology through the patent-holding firm's disclosure, as they frequently do
today. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 1421, 1464-65 (2009). The attractiveness of such suits-which under coordination
theory are an unintended byproduct of patent protection-could be reduced through an
independent derivation defense. See infra Section IlI.B.3.
122 To see this, remember that a firm will share its information when B > d(S + C - pX).
If C approaches 0 (patent remedies are cheap to obtain), p approaches 1 (patent holder
victory is guaranteed), and X approaches S (patent remedies restore all control-dependent
value), the downside risk of sharing is effectively eliminated, and any information-sharing
opportunity with positive benefit (B > 0) will satisfy the condition.
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may be less valuable to the firm than the control the firm previously enjoyed
under secrecy. There are a number of reasons this is likely to be true: patent
rights are temporally and geographically limited; the technical scope of patents
sometimes leave room for circumvention; and courts can decline to enter
injunctions. In that case, the firm still faces some potential downside from
sharing its information-if future unplanned use occurs, the resulting patent
remedies will not fully restore the firm to its prior position. When this occurs,
patents alleviate some, but not all, of the risks of sharing information.1
23
Another way patent rights may leave a firm with some residual risk from
information sharing is from the failure of those rights themselves. However
strong or weak they are, patent remedies only become available if the firm can
prevail in an infringement suit.1
24 But there are a number of ways a recipient of
previously confidential information may escape patent liability entirely. She
may find ways to use the information that do not infringe the patent. She may
show that the scope of the patent's claims is narrower than it appears. She may
succeed in defeating the validity of the patent itself. These defenses introduce
the very real chance that a patent may later to turn out not to provide any
fallback protection at all. As with weaker patent remedies, the possibility that
patent protection will fail leaves a disclosing firm with some residual risk of
loss.125
123 Again, the firm will share its information when B > d(S + C - pX). If patent remedies
do not fully restore the information's original control-dependent value, then X < S. Because
the probability p of getting patent remedies can never be greater than 1, it follows that the
expected value of patent-based exclusivity must be less than the information's original
control-dependent value (i.e., pX < S). When that is the case, the right side of the inequality
above-d(S + C - pX)--must be greater than 0, meaning that the firm still faces some
residual expected loss as a result of a decision to share information.
.24 This does not mean the firm will necessarily need to proceed to a full patent trial. But
a credible threat to do so will typically be necessary to achieve a settlement outcome that
restores the firm's lost value.
125 A decrease in the probability of obtaining patent remedies has a similar effect as a
decrease in the value of the remedy itself. See supra note 123. As the probability p of
successful enforcement gets smaller, the expected value of patent-based exclusivity pX gets
smaller as well. Once the expected value of patent remedies becomes smaller than the
original control-dependent value of the information (i.e., pX < S), then d(S + C - pX) must
be greater than 0, and firms still face some residual expected loss as a result of a decision to
share information. Note that some reductions in the probability of a patentee victory can (at
least theoretically) be offset by offering patent remedies that more than restore the
information's original control-dependent value-that is, by setting X > S. But there is likely
a limit to the extent that generous patent remedies can offset small probabilities of patent
victory. First of all, a patent court's ability to compensate patent holders is not infinite-
patent remedies are necessarily limited by time, geography, technical scope, and the
resources of the infringers before the court. Second, even when it is feasible to compensate
patent holders beyond the control-dependent value that was lost, the risk aversion of patent
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Thus, the success of the coordination function is critically dependent on two
factors: the reliability of patent rights, and the ability of those rights to provide
secrecy-like exclusion. When patents provide a high likelihood of obtaining
secrecy-like exclusion, they will induce a large amount of patent-backed
information sharing, and the coordination function will be maximally effective.
Conversely, if the likelihood of a patent victory is low and patent remedies are
weak, the patent system will not offer much comfort in the case of an
unplanned future use, and very little patent-backed information sharing will
occur.
B. Several New Degrees of Freedom
The generalized coordination theory described in the prior section leads to
two requirements that have a significant effect on the coordination function's
effectiveness: reliable patent rights and secrecy-like exclusion. These are not
particularly surprising, for the same characteristics would increase the
effectiveness of the rewards function as well. 126 However, the more interesting
aspects of the coordination story are found in what it does not say. This Section
highlights the ways in which the operation of the coordination function departs
from that of the traditional rewards function.
1. No Direct Reliance on the Initial Allocation of Patent Rights
The coordination function operates by giving firms an alternate mechanism
for controlling how information is used after disclosure.27 To serve this
function effectively, patents must offer predictable rights of sufficient scope to
enable firms to reliably backstop their private arrangements. But, notably,
nothing in this framework depends on the initial allocation of patent grants.
This feature of the coordination function relaxes several conditions that are
necessary for a well-functioning rewards system.
When it comes to the traditional rewards function, the initial allocation of
patent rights is critical. The work of the rewards function is, after all, to
increase incentives to invent by transferring a thing of value to those who
successfully produce a new invention. 28 Errors in the initial allocation of
patents directly frustrate this goal because they weaken the relationship
between the desired conduct (invention) and the promised reward (a patent).29
holders may prevent generous remedies from completely offsetting low likelihoods of
victory.
126 In this context, "effectiveness" refers only to the power of the incentives offered to
the inventors of first-generation technologies. This does not imply that such maximalism
would constitute optimal rewards-focused patent policy. See supra Section I.B.
27 See supra Section III.A.
128 See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 5, at 1033, 1035.
129 See Abramowicz, supra note 38, at 180 (noting that a prize system requires some
method of identifying worthwhile innovations and rejecting others). This can happen
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As a result, the rewards function implies a compelling interest not only in
granting patents to those who deserve them, but also in denying them to (and
perhaps revoking them from) those who do not.
As the coordination function does not seek to incentivize private conduct
through the promise of a prize, it has no direct dependence on the initial
allocation of patents. Instead, what matters is the final allocation-that patents
ultimately end up in the hands of parties who can rely on them to transfer
technical information. Though in practice the matter is more complex,30 at a
theoretical level the coordination function could be served just as well by a
system that allocates patents randomly and makes them easy to trade as it
could by a system that awards patents cautiously.
One way of looking at this distinction is that some version of the Coase
theorem is applicable in the case of the coordination function, but not in the
case of the rewards function. For purposes of the coordination function, if
rights are inefficiently allocated, private negotiation is available to reach a
more efficient configuration.13' This process will not be free-there will
certainly be transaction costs in identifying partners and negotiating the trade.
But when it comes to the rewards function, mistakes in allocation cannot be
solved by Coasian bargaining at all. The purpose of the patent grant is to affect
distribution, so it is no comfort to say that the parties can trade after the fact.
Particularly when the costs of trading patents are high, the coordination
function may still justify a resource-intensive effort to try to put patents in the
proper hands from the beginning.132 But the significance of the initial
allocation of patents is indirect: it matters only to the extent it affects the final
allocation of patents and the costs of reaching that state. This is in sharp
through mistakes in either direction. For example, when a patent is improperly denied to a
rightful inventor, ex ante incentives to invent are reduced because inventors face an
increased risk that even if they succeed in achieving a patentable invention, they will
nonetheless be denied their reward. See Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent Law, 39
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 762 (2012). Going the other way, a patent that is improperly
granted also reduces incentives to invest in invention because it introduces the possibility
that an applicant will receive the benefits of a patent whether or not she deserves them. The
incentives to invest in invention-the very core of the rewards function-thus depend both
on the likelihood that a patent will be granted if an invention is achieved and on the
likelihood that a patent will not be granted if an invention is not achieved. See generally
Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System (working paper) (on file
with author).
1 See infra Section IV.A.
'3' See Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL
& EMERGING Bus. L. 137, 147-48 (2000) (applying Coase in this way); see also Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1094-95 (1972) (discussing similar
implications).
132 See infra Section IV.A.
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contrast to the rewards function, where accuracy in the initial allocation of
patents is critical to the function's success.
2. No Intermediate Goal of Wealth Transfer
The coordination function is in many ways less ambitious than the
traditional rewards function. All that is necessary for the coordination function
to succeed is the creation of reliable private rights to exclude others from using
a particular body of information. Allocating these rights to private parties may
well have other effects: distributional consequences, the creation of market
power, or subtle pressures on industry structure, just to name a few. But these
consequences are collateral, and as a result, a policymaker may find she has
much more latitude implementing the coordination function than she does
implementing the rewards function.
As the rewards function seeks to directly incentivize investment in research
and development by promising a patent as a prize, it is inherently sensitive to
the total ex ante value proposition offered by the patent system.33 For
example, an increase in the costs of acquiring or maintaining a patent will
reduce the value of the promised patent reward-particularly because the costs
of securing a patent are certain to be incurred, and the potential benefits of
successful enforcement of that patent are probabilistic.134 Similarly, it is
critical that at least some patents result in monopoly rents sufficient to justify
the persistent costs and risks of investing in research and participating in the
patent system. 135 If the total package of costs and benefits offered by the patent
system does not result in some upside when an invention turns out to be a
success, the patent system will fail in its goal of creating additional incentives
to try.
13 6
The coordination function does not depend on any such promise of riches,
which opens up a variety of policy options that would not be possible under the
rewards function. For one, there is no need to distribute patents as privately
valuable grants-they could be allocated by auction, for instance, allowing
competitive bidding to reduce the private surplus inherent in patent issuance.'37
133 See Abramowicz, supra note 38, at 124; Liivak, supra note 10, at 1165.
14 See Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77, 93 (2014).
135 See Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the
Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 141, 142-43 (2008); Ariel Katz, Making Sense of
Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and Market Power, 49 ARIZ. L. REv. 837, 841-42
(2007); Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really A Substitute for Coke?
Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2094-96 (2012).
136 However, these benefits need not flow exclusively from wealth transfer. See Long,
supra note 55, at 636-37.
"I7 See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & EcON. 55, 63 (1968). For a
thorough discussion on the costs, benefits, and feasibility of allocating patents by auction,
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And even once patents are issued, their role in coordination is simply to allow
an information-sharing firm to restore the control-dependent value that it
previously possessed. Some changes in the scope, duration, or intensity of
patent rights may not affect the coordination function at all, provided they
leave intact this core ability to reliably restore control.
This theoretical distinction does not imply there are no practical limits.
Some changes affecting patent value may not impair the coordination function,
but others will. For example, a change in patentability standards that makes it
significantly more difficult to obtain patents in the first instance could weaken
the coordination function (as well as the rewards function), since the exchange
of technical information in reliance on patents depends on having an adequate
stock of patents in circulation upon which to rely.138 If patents become too
difficult or expensive to obtain, firms may forgo the coordination function of
patents and rely on secrecy instead. The lack of a wealth-transfer goal opens up
a variety of policy options, but this newfound flexibility is not infinite.
3. The Possibility of Independent Derivation
Another way coordination-focused patent policy can afford to be flexible
relates to use of patented technology by firms that did not receive any
information from the original disclosing firm. The central work of the
coordination function is to restore a disclosing firm to the position it was in
prior to disclosure. But this is as far as it must go. Once those who received the
original confidential information (as a direct or indirect result of the disclosure)
have been restrained from using or further disclosing the information, the
patent system has completed its mission. There is no need to interfere with
others who have come upon the same thing independently.
This is in contrast to the rewards function, where the ability to exclude
independent third parties is an important determinant of the value of patent
rights and therefore the system's effectiveness. If a patent only included the
right to exclude copyists, the prize for achieving a successful, patentable
invention would be significantly smaller.139 From the perspective of the
rewards function, this change in the private value would provide a weaker
incentive to engage in research and participate in the patent system.
140
see Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races over Auctions, 60 STAN. L.
REv. 803 (2007).
"I See infra Section IV.C.
131 See Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105
MICH. L. REv. 1525, 1529-32 (2007).
140 Rewards-focused reasoning might, however, contemplate a limited defense in cases
where the cost of providing exclusion is particularly high compared to the private value of
that exclusion, such as in a case of near-simultaneous invention. See, e.g., Stephen M.
Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defense in Intellectual Property,
69 ECONOMICA 535, 540-42 (2002); Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 AM. ECON. REV.
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The effectiveness of the coordination function does not turn on the private
value of patents, or on the number of potential infringers that can be hauled in
to court to contribute to the inventor's prize purse. Instead, the central question
is whether the accused infringer is one who directly or indirectly received
previously confidential information from the patent holder. When the answer
to that question is confidently "no," there is no reliance interest from a prior
information exchange at play, and future coordination will not be affected by
whether the accused party is deemed an infringer. Independent derivation
could thus be made a defense to patent infringement without reducing the
effectiveness of the coordination function.
This potential exception is in some ways similar to the independent
invention defense that has been proposed by commentators,14 1 or to the prior
user defense recently created by the America Invents Act (the "AIA"). 142 But
there are important differences as well. To illustrate, consider a scenario in
which Firm A sends some design plans out for bid in reliance on its patent
portfolio. Firm B receives the bid package, but instead of agreeing to work
with Firm A, decides to steal the plans and compete directly against Firm A.
Firm A resorts to its patent fallback plan, asserting various patents against Firm
B in hopes of restoring the exclusivity it originally enjoyed in its design plans.
As traditionally conceived, an independent invention or prior user doctrine
could give Firm B a potential defense on these facts. When Firm A asserts a
patent, Firm B would have the opportunity to show that it independently
conceived and reduced to practice Firm A's claimed invention before hearing
about it from Firm A.143 If so, Firm A would have no patent remedies against
Firm B. But for purposes of the coordination function, inquiring about the
origin of the claimed invention is the wrong question. Rather, the inquiry must
focus on whether Firm B independently created the previously confidential
information (here, the design plans) before it came into contact with Firm A.
Because Firm B took its design plans from Firm A, it should not be able to
invoke an independent derivation defense, even if it may have independently
invented the subject matter of Firm A's patents some time before.
92, 95 (2006); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent
Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REv. 475, 489-90, 493-94 (2006).
141 See, e.g., Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 140, at 535; Shapiro, supra note 140, at
92; Vermont, supra note 140, at 475.
142 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 5(a), 125 Stat. 297 (codified
at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012)).
143 Vermont, supra note 140, at 484-86. In other formulations, the defendant would be
required to demonstrate steps towards commercialization as well. See Lemley, supra note
139, at 1533-34. Under the AIA, Firm B would need to show that it used the claimed
invention commercially in the United States at least one year prior to the patent's filing date.
See 35 U.S.C. § 273(a).
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In the other direction, there are situations in which the independent
derivation defense would apply and these other defenses would not. For
example, independent invention and prior use typically require that the
defendant conceived of the invention either before or around the same time as
the plaintiff did.'44 But for independent derivation, the critical date is the day
the plaintiff encountered the defendant's disclosure. So if Firm B
independently created some design plans well after Firm A filed a patent, but
before Firm B had any opportunity to copy Firm A's design plans, the
independent derivation defense should be available. For purposes of the
coordination function, all that matters is that Firm B did not obtain its design
plans from Firm A.
Caution is in order here. The case for using patents to facilitate coordination
is rooted, in part, in problems of proof when it comes to tracing the flow of
information.145 As presumptively in rem rights, patents offer the possibility of
exclusion even in cases where evidence of copying is lacking. An independent
derivation defense would need to be carefully crafted to avoid forfeiting the
very evidentiary advantages that make patents useful in situations where other
exclusion mechanisms have failed. For example, if the patent holder were
required to prove that the defendant obtained a particular piece of valuable
information from the patent holder, the patent system might have little ability
to facilitate publication or multilateral exchange over and above the existing
nonpatent alternatives. But, designed properly, an independent derivation
defense could be perfectly compatible with a robust coordination-focused
patent system.
For all of these reasons, a purely coordination-focused patent system could
look radically different from the patent system as it exists today. In some ways,
the design of this hypothetical new system would be more constrained-the
success of the coordination function depends critically on patents constituting
reliable rights that bring strong remedies. But in other ways, a coordination-
focused system could afford to be more flexible. Patents could be handed out
randomly, or initially allocated by a public auction. Changes could be made
affecting their private value, so long as the core rights of reliable exclusion
were preserved. Claims of infringement could be subjected to new defenses,
carving out third-parties who had no prior contact with the patent holder. On
the whole, it is not clear whether patent rights would be stronger or weaker if
the current system were replaced by a purely coordination-focused regime.
144 The AIA requires that the defendant had a commercial use at least one year before the
plaintiff's filing date. See 35 U.S.C. § 273(a). Other proposals are more forgiving, but
nonetheless terminate the possibility of independent invention at some constructive notice
date. See, e.g., Vermont, supra note 140, at 485-87.
141 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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What is clear is that equivalence between coordination- and rewards-focused
policies should no longer be presumed.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR PATENT POLICY
As the prior Parts discussed, it is too simplistic to assume that invoking
coordination theory as a justification for the patent system will inevitably lead
to the same policy prescriptions as rewards theory. The coordination function
is directed at a different problem, and it employs a distinctive method for
addressing that problem. As a result, the features of the patent system that will
determine its effectiveness are different too. If the reason for having a patent
system were to change completely from rewarding invention to facilitating
coordination, it would be appropriate to revisit every area of patent doctrine
that was previously settled under rewards-focused reasoning to at least
consider whether this change in purpose justifies a change in law. Nothing of
the status quo should be assumed or taken for granted.
For example, consider the initial allocation of patents. If, as noted in Part III,
the coordination function is compatible with handing out patents randomly, or
by auction, what should be done with the patent eligibility doctrines that
comprise the very heart of patent law, such as the requirements of novelty,
nonobviousness, and enablement?146 In fact, why even bother to examine
patents at all? If the coordination function is embraced as the exclusive
purpose of the patent system, the entire patent examiner corps could be
replaced by a troop of patent auctioneers.
But, since any shift from rewards goals to coordination goals will likely be
gradual-and, after all, the two objectives are not mutually exclusive-it is
also worth considering how recognition of the coordination function would call
for changes to patent policy at the margin, without explicitly abandoning a
concurrent goal of rewarding invention. This Part highlights various
characteristics and policies of the existing system that would need to be
reevaluated as the coordination function takes on more prominence in
comparison to the rewards function.
A. Reliability of Issued Patents over Correction of Patent Office Mistakes
A longstanding feature of the patent system is its two-stage review process,
wherein an application is first examined by the patent office and then
146 The apparent failure of "ex post" theories (including coordination theory) to explain
such doctrines has been a cause of prior criticism. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 3, at 137-40.
It is possible that these requirements play some role in increasing the cost effectiveness of
the coordination function (such as limiting patent rights to emerging technology areas where
valuable nonpublic information is likely to exist), but, for the reasons cited above, they do
not appear to be essential.
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scrutinized a second time by a court when a patentee seeks to enforce it.
147 The
interaction of these two review periods implicates a number of patent policies:
the level of scrutiny to be applied at each stage, the deference (if any) to be
applied from one stage to the other, the desirability of encouraging post-grant
challenges, and so on. On one end of the spectrum, one could have a
registration system, in which patents are issued by the patent office without
any substantive examination, only to be reviewed de novo by courts should
they come to litigation.148 On the other end, one could have a system of
ironclad patent grants, wherein applications are given extensive substantive
review by the patent office, after which questions of patentability could be
revisited only in cases of outright fraud.
Importantly, the allocation of responsibilities between the first- and second-
stage decisionmakers is independent of the total amount of scrutiny applied
throughout the process. Either the registration system or the ironclad grant
system described in the prior paragraph could be implemented with many or
few precautions against erroneous patent enforcement-the difference between
the two approaches is only when those precautions would be applied.
A shift from the rewards function to the coordination function has potential
significance for both the total amount of scrutiny to be applied and the
allocation of that scrutiny between first- and second-stage decisionmakers.
When it comes to the total amount of scrutiny, the consequences of this shift
from rewards to coordination are somewhat ambiguous. On one hand, the
success of the rewards function depends directly on the ability of the patent
system to award patents to those who deserve them and denied to those who do
not.149 When a patent is erroneously granted, erroneously denied, or given to
the wrong party, it weakens the correlation between the desired conduct and
the promised reward.
The coordination function does not have this same reliance on initial
allocation, but it does require that patents end up in the hands of firms with
confidential information to exchange. When a firm is denied a patent that it
needed to facilitate information transfer, the firm will have to go to the
147 In recent years, this two-stage system has been complicated by the creation of
multiple post-grant review processes, whereby the patent office itself may engage in further
scrutiny after the patent has issued. See Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L.
REv. 881, 914-23 (2015) (providing an in-depth examination of the review processes
established by the AIA). These processes are difficult to classify, because in some ways they
are a form of extended first-stage examination, and in other ways they are an alternate forum
for second-stage examination. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131,
2142-44 (2016) (observing that new review processes have elements of both agency
proceedings and judicial proceedings).
148 See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of
Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REv. 55, 70-72 (2003).
149 See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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secondary market to acquire it. If the costs of doing this are substantial, the
firm may forego the patent system altogether, instead relying on other methods
of protecting its confidential information. In this way, the initial allocation of
patents can affect the success of the coordination function just as it does the
rewards function.
As a result, there is not a simple, generalizable answer as to whether the
rewards function or the coordination function would call for greater total
investment in patent scrutiny. When the cost of trading patents is high,'50 a
focus on coordination might make it even more important to ensure that
patents are initially assigned where they belong. But when the cost of trading
patents is low, the balance could come out the other way-that is, the
coordination function could tolerate a much rougher system of allocation than
the rewards function. So whether the rewards function or the coordination
function calls for greater care in the allocation of patents might very well
depend on the circumstances.
However, when it comes to dividing that scrutiny between the steps of initial
examination and subsequent review, the policy implications of a move from
rewards to coordination are clearer. The effectiveness of the coordination
function depends significantly on the reliability of patent grants.151 If patents
are frequently narrowed or invalidated after issuance, a firm choosing to share
information faces greater risk that its patent fallback plan will fail when called
upon. Earlier certainty about the validity and scope of patent rights would thus
make the system a more reliable tool for mitigating the potential downsides of
disclosure.
Another, perhaps more subtle, way in which the coordination function
depends on the stability of patent rights relates to the cost of trading patents.
The coordination function does not depend directly on the initial allocation of
patent rights--Coasian bargaining is at least theoretically available as an
alternate means of correcting mistaken patent grants.1 52 To the extent that the
indeterminacy and instability of patent rights renders them more expensive to
trade, overreliance on second-stage revocation may quixotically increase the
systemic cost of erroneous grants, and actually increase the need to apply even
more scrutiny at the first stage. Or, to put it positively, shifting scrutiny to an
earlier point in the patenting process may enable bargaining as an alternate
solution to erroneous allocations, and thus reduce the degree of scrutiny
required overall.
From the perspective of the rewards function, the private incentives created
by the patent system depend little on when patent awards become finalized.
Uncertainty about patent rights might diminish their value a bit, but this is not
150 And there is reason to believe this is often the case. See Merges & Nelson, supra note
50, at 874-75.
151 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
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fatal-any incentives to invent lost as a result of frequent post-grant revocation
can be compensated by more generous policies somewhere else.
153 Because
stability itself has no special role to play in the rewards function, a rewards-
focused system can afford to regularly grant patents with serious doubts about
their validity and rely on private litigation to fix errors after the 
fact.154
A move towards the coordination function complicates this "grant first,
verify later" strategy. The consequences here reach far, as the trade-off
between first- and second-stage review is practically everywhere in patent law.
For example, accepting coordination as a goal of the patent system could
warrant a reevaluation of the degree of patent office scrutiny applied to
applications prior to issuance,
155 the strength of the presumption of validity
after a patent has issued,56 the need for bounties or other incentives to
challenge patents,157 the enforceability of agreements not to bring
challenges,158 and the antitrust analysis applied to reverse settlement
payments.
159
Although each of these domains will require its own analysis, a recent
dispute involving the presumption of validity illustrates how policy might
"'5 See Abramowicz, supra note 38, at 215-18 (observing that harms from uncertainty to
a prize system are easily overstated); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent
Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REv. 45, 57-59 (2007) (identifying various
sources of uncertainty confronting patentees).
154 See Lemley, supra note 53, at 1508-11. And indeed a number of rewards-focused
cases invoke the compelling public interest in seeing validity challenges litigated to
completion. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230-34 (2013); Caraco Pharm.
Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1677 (2012); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc.
v. Univ. of 11. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349-50 (1971); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653,
670-71 (1969); Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill.
2003); In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 850, 868 (Cal. 2015).
151 See Lemley, supra note 53, at 1497; Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhavan
Sampat, What to Do About Bad Patents?, 28 REGULATION, Winter 2005-2006, at 10, 12-13.
156 See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 153, at 45.
157 See generally Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage
Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667 (2004); John R. Thomas,
Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001
U. ILL. L. REv. 305.
158 See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the
Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REv. 677 (1986); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S.
Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives to Innovate After MedImmune, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
971 (2009).
"' See generally Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework
for Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REv. 37 (2009); David W. Opderbeck, Rational
Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements in Hatch- Waxman Patent Litigation, 98
GEO. L.J. 1303 (2010); James F. Ponsoldt & W. Hennen Ehrenclou, The Antitrust Legality
of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 37.
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come out differently under rewards- or coordination-focused points of view.
When the patent office has considered prior art and specifically granted a
patent in view of that art, the case for applying a strong presumption of validity
in subsequent litigation is straightforward. After all, theories sounding in either
rewards or coordination would advise a court to be cautious about second-
guessing the judgment of the expert agency.60 But what if-as in the recent
Supreme Court case of Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership'16'-new art is
discovered that the patent office did not have the opportunity to consider?
With principles of agency deference out of the way, one must confront the
question of whether it is more important for patent grants to be settled or
right. 62 From the perspective of rewards theory, the answer is straightforward.
The rewards function, after all, places a high value on allocating patents to the
parties that deserve them, with comparatively less significance placed on the
stability of patent rights over time. This, in turn, suggests the presumption of
validity should carry less force when a challenger produces prior art that the
patent office did not consider-a result that both the i4i Court163 and rewards-
focused commentators have endorsed.164
Under the coordination view, the importance of patent reliability is
significantly heightened. The fact that the patent office might have reached a
different outcome if it had more complete information does not undermine the
core justification for the strong presumption of validity, which is to facilitate
patent-backed information exchange by protecting the reliance interests of
patent holders. Thus, absent fraud or other misbehavior by the patentee,165 a
coordination-focused approach would suggest that the strength of the
160 See Intervet Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Labs., Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
("The presumption of validity... carries with it a presumption the examiner did his duty
and knew what claims he was allowing.").
161 564 U.S. 91 (2011).
162 See id. at 111.
163 Although the presumption of validity still applies in cases of new evidence, the patent
office's judgment loses "significant force," and the existence of evidence not considered by
the agency is typically noted for the jury. Id. Recent experiments have suggested that, in
practice, flagging the existence of new evidence like this may have the same effect as if no
heightened presumption were applied at all. See David L. Schwartz & Christopher B.
Seaman, Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Experiment from Patent Law, 26 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 429, 432, 459 (2013).
164 Doug Lichtman and Mark Lemley tie this concern to rewards goals concisely,
concluding that the presumption "seems to encourage investment in the wrong
inventions... [,] technologies that are likely redundant to things society knew before."
Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 153, at 58.
165 Even under a coordination-focused approach, it may be useful to weaken the
presumption in some circumstances as a way of disciplining applicants' behavior during the




presumption of validity should not turn on the nature of the evidence that
happens to be brought against the patent.
This is but one example of how a move towards the coordination function
would call existing patent doctrine into question-the various policy questions
highlighted above will undoubtedly require more extensive analysis. As a
general rule, however, coordination-focused patent policy will tend to prefer
rules favoring earlier certainty, at least as compared to the traditional rewards-
based approach.
B. Technological Exclusivity over Market Exclusivity
Another persistent issue at the heart of patent policy is the breadth of
protection that ought to be afforded to a successful patentee. From the
perspective of rewards-focused policymaking, this balancing comes down to
questions about exactly how much society would benefit from increased in
incentives to invent and how much these increased incentives would cost. In
general, the broader the claim scope, the larger the reward promised by the
patent system, and the larger the costs imposed on the rest of society.
166 In the
other direction, the narrower the claim scope, the smaller the incentives created
by the patent system, and the lower the costs to everyone else.
167
Setting claim scope to produce a right-sized reward is a famously difficult
undertaking. For the rewards function to be effective, the patent system must
award valuable patents for valuable inventions.
168 This means claim scope
must be broad enough to create market power in cases where the underlying
invention turns out to be important.169 But market power is also a driver of the
major costs of the patent system-the static and dynamic losses from the
patentee's exclusive use of the invention.170 What makes this trade-off more
difficult than, say, selecting the size of the purse in a cash prize system, is that
there will not always be a predictable relationship between the scope of
technical exclusivity (the breadth as defined by the patent's claims) and the
scope of market exclusivity (which will determine the patentee's market power
and hence the value of the patent prize).
171 For example, a technically broad
'66 See Yelderman, supra note 134, at 88-89.
167 Id.
168 See Liivak, supra note 10, at 1165.
169 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 36, at 103-05; Crouch, supra note 135, at 142-43; Katz,
supra note 135, at 837, 858-59, 859 n.117, 862-63; Lemley & McKenna, supra note 135, at
2111-14.
170 See Liivak, supra note 10, at 1172-73. In IP theory generally, this balancing is often
referred to as the "incentives vs. access" tradeoff. See Glynn S. Lunney, Reexamining
Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. RaV. 483, 556-571 (1996).
171 See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
761, 791-92 (2005). For a thorough discussion of the relationship between technical
exclusivity and market exclusivity, see Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience
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patent could turn out to have little competitive significance if a handful of
alternative solutions using fundamentally different technologies emerge soon
thereafter. And a technically narrow patent could inadvertently dominate an
entire product market if it happens to cover a critical step in a larger process.
This can lead to significant divergence in individual cases between a patentee's
technical accomplishment and the value of the prize awarded. 172
These questions about the right-sizing of exclusive rights are not limited to
the initial granting of claims by the patent office. They also emerge when
patentees attempt to enforce their rights in technology areas far from the
original invention, expand the scope of their exclusivity through acquisitions of
competitors' portfolios, and seek broader claims late in the patent lifecycle.173
From the perspective of the rewards function, each raises a similar question
about whether the expected benefits from increasing patent rewards are worth
their expected cost in light of available alternatives to achieve the same results.
In practice this is quite difficult, particularly because it is so challenging to
map technical exclusivity onto market exclusivity in a predictable way.174
The coordination function implies a very different set of concerns when it
comes to claim scope. The success of the coordination function depends on
information-holding firms' ability to exclude others from making future use of
information that will be the subject of disclosure.175 If the scope of protection
afforded by a patent portfolio is too narrow, it may be incapable of
backstopping contractual agreements around technical information or enabling
wider information sharing.176 But this does not mean the coordination function
calls for patents of unlimited scope. Once a firm's portfolio is broad enough to
prevent others from using the firm's particular technology, the benefits of
providing broader scope diminish substantially.177 Thus, the coordination
in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L.REv. 1251, 1285-94 (2014).
172 See F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery: The Empirical Case for Copyright and
Patents, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY
FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3-21 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); Crouch,
supra note 135, at 149-54. Michael Abramowicz makes a similar observation (albeit from a
different angle) in noting the difficulties of valuing patents for purposes of a government-
funded buyout. See Abramowicz, supra note 38, at 155-56.
173 See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 1, at 200-03; Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1867-73.
174 See Janet Freilich, The Uninformed Topography of Patent Scope, 19 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 150, 155-57 (2015). For a similar point regarding the failure of patent scope to account
for market structure, see SCOTCHMER, supra note 36, at 117-18.
175 See supra Section III.A.
176 Cf Burstein, supra note 7, at 259-60.
177 It is possible that broader scope could facilitate disclosure and exchange of certain
nontechnical information: customer lists, marketing techniques, and so on. However, these
are outside the scope of the coordination function because they do not relate to the transfer
of technical information. See supra Section II.A. The costs and benefits of using exclusive
rights to enable disclosure of nontechnical information are likely quite different and would
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function would call for claim scope that provides just enough technical
exclusivity to facilitate sharing of information about the firm's specific
technology, but without reaching to competing solutions.
This highlights an important distinction between the coordination and
rewards theories: the benefits of the coordination function flow from technical
exclusivity, not market exclusivity. Provided that a patent, or a portfolio of
patents, confers exclusive rights broad enough to prevent others from using the
shared information, the degree to which competition is displaced at the level of
product markets is irrelevant to the success of the coordination function.
178
A simple example illustrates how the appropriateness of claim scope would
be assessed ifferently under either a rewards- or coordination-focused patent
system. Suppose there is a pressing and widespread problem that everyone
would like to see solved. Firms A, B, and C set down different technological
paths, each in pursuit of its own particular solution. And it turns out that all
three are successful: Firm A files for a foundational patent on its approach, as
do Firms B and C on their respective approaches. All three firms continue to
work diligently to commercialize their technologies, investing in further
research and preparing to ramp up production.
In a perfect world, how broad should each firm's exclusive rights be in this
situation? From a rewards perspective, the answer is not entirely clear. Should
the patent office grant Firm A claims that cover the entire product market, or
just its particular solution? Should antitrust authorities allow Firm A to buy
Firm B's patent portfolio? Should a court enforce a three-way license
agreement between the competitors that sets a minimum price on any
infringing products that any of the three firms sell? These questions are more
difficult to answer than they might first appear. If unrestrained competition is
allowed to break out among the three firms, there is a risk that prices will
quickly fall to marginal cost, preventing the firms from recouping their
extensive investments in research and development. But if competition is
eliminated entirely, the private rewards afforded by the patent system could be
inappropriately large, resulting in unnecessary deadweight losses and other
social harms. Though in individual cases the analysis may not be so nuanced,
rewards theory constantly confronts the same recurring dilemma: whether an
n-competitor product market offers sufficient incentives to invent, or whether
some additional reduction in competition should be granted or available.
1 79
From a coordination perspective, the solution is straightforward: each firm
should be granted patent protection broad enough to enable sharing of
require their own analysis.
178 The degree of market exclusivity would still matter to a coordination-focused
policymaker, however, because it will have a significant effect on the public costs of
offering patent protection. The insight here is only that the benefits of the coordination
function do not depend on awarding market exclusivity.
179 Cf Crane, supra note 47, at 271-75.
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information related to its specific technology. Exclusivity that assures each
firm that others will not be able to use its particular solution to the problem
should be sufficient to reduce the cost of further development and increase the
firm's technical transparency. Critically, the effectiveness of the coordination
function does not turn on the extent of the market power created by the patents
in question. In fact, the goals of coordination can be perfectly satisfied even if
Firms A, B, and C end up in brutal three-way competition in the relevant
product market. And, though the question of how broad patent protection must
be to facilitate information sharing may at times be difficult to answer, it is a
question the patent office is institutionally better equipped to navigate, as it
depends on the state of technology rather than the state of competition.
This observation is an important one, not least because it suggests that much
of the debate about the desirability of using the patent system to facilitate
coordination has been based on flawed assumptions. Since its inception, the
coordination function has been associated with a policy of issuing broad patent
claims early in a technology's lifecycle.180 Operating on this premise,
commentators have been divided as to whether this feature of the coordination
function is a blessing or a curse. 181 But this long-held assumption overlooks the
distinction between technical and market exclusivity. It should be possible, in
most cases, to create technical exclusivity with scope equal to or less than the
scope necessary to create market exclusivity. So there may actually be less
need for broad claims in a patent system focused on coordination than in one
focused on rewards. 182
Another consequence of this distinction is that coordination theory may
offer some help with problems that have transfixed rewards theory, such as the
antitrust analysis that should be applied to a merger of competing patent
portfolios. In this situation, rewards theory asks the antitrust regulator to trade
static harms (increased market power) against potential dynamic benefits
(increased incentive to invent).183 This balancing is tough enough at a macro
180 See Kitch, supra note 3, at 267-68. Indeed, this association is so strong that it is often
unclear whether "prospect theory" refers to the goal of coordinating development or this
particular collection of patent policies. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
181 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 319; SCOTC-MER, supra note 36, at 112-14;
Abramowicz, supra note 33, at 1081; Duffy, supra note 3, at 442-46, 499-500; McFetridge
& Smith, supra note 58, at 198.
182 The conclusion here would be quite different if the "coordination function" were
defined to include a goal of reducing duplicative investments by granting a pioneer the
ability to restrict subsequent entry-a theory based on that definition might well depend on
market, not simply technological, exclusivity. See supra note 102. This illustrates the peril
of commingling theories of coordination and theories of duplicative investments under the
banner of "prospect theory." Analytically, they solve different problems and, as
demonstrated here, could have very different policy implications.
"R3 See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1868-69.
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level, but it is even more difficult to perform through a series of individual
enforcement decisions. As a result, current patent and antitrust rules can
provide few concrete answers as to when patent portfolio aggregation is
procompetitive and when it is anticompetitive.
184
A coordination-focused patent system would offer a much simpler principle
for determining when patent portfolio aggregation is justified and when it is
not. As discussed above, the coordination function depends on a firm holding a
patent portfolio that allows it to reliably exclude others from using its
particular technological solution. Sometimes such protection will be granted in
the form of a single patent or multiple patents issued to the same firm. In other
cases, the initial patent grants will fracture the rights across multiple owners in
a way that makes them incapable of facilitating coordination. In this situation,
coordination-focused patent policy would recognize an efficiency justification
in favor of combining multiple patent portfolios. But, importantly, the
coordination function's focus on technical exclusivity over market exclusivity
would also impose a limit. When two competing portfolios relate to different
technologies, there is no added coordination benefit to be found in their
aggregation, and further combinations may only serve to reduce competition.
Thus the coordination view could provide a framework for distinguishing
between desirable and undesirable combinations of patent portfolios, a line that
existing, rewards-based octrine often struggles to draw.
C. A Window of Patent Maturity over Precise Timing of Eligibility and
Expiration
Another persistent set of issues in the theory and implementation of the
patent system relates to time. At what point in the development of a technology
should patent rights be awarded? For how long should they last? What is the
significance of the period between when an inventor is eligible to apply for a
patent and when that patent legally comes into force?
When cash prizes are used to reward invention, the timing of prize eligibility
is critical. If the prize for accomplishing some result is given too early, the
system may create inappropriately large incentives to race towards that
premature fmish line, followed by inappropriately small incentives to actually
complete the project.185 On the other hand, if the prize is awarded too late in
184 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIzONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
31 (2010) (noting that "the ability of the merged firm to appropriate a greater fraction of the
benefits resulting from its innovations" is sometimes cognizable as a merger-specific
efficiency), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BJA5-D4D6]; see also SCOTCHMER, supra note 36, at 161, 177-78; Keke
Feng, Patent-Related Mergers and Market Definition Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines: The Need to Consider Technology and Innovation Markets, 34 T. JEFFERSON L.
REv. 197, 201 (2011).
18 See Abramowicz, supra note 38, at 176-77.
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the process, the incentives to achieve the desired result are weakened, at least
because of the risk that a firm may be the first to accomplish the big
breakthrough, only to be foiled by a second-mover that steps in to claim the
prize.186 Thus, it is not only important that the reward be the right size and
given to the right person, but also that all of this happen at an appropriate point
in the technology development cycle.
Providing incentives to invent through a patent system mitigates some, but
not all, of these problems. One of the benefits of using exclusive rights in lieu
of cash prizes is that they can create incentives both before and after they are
awarded.187 If an inventor becomes eligible for a patent before the invention is
truly completed, it's not the end of the world, because the inventor will still
have some incentive to continue development of the project-doing so
improves the value of her patent. This takes some of the pressure off the
question of when an invention should become patent-eligible, though there are
nonetheless complex issues at play in correctly balancing pre- and post-grant
incentives and in ensuring that patents expire at an appropriate time.188
A move towards coordination goals further relaxes the requirement that
inventions become eligible for patents at a precise point in a technology's
development. The coordination function is not intended to directly incentivize
any specific conduct, so it does not imply a need to align the timing of a prize
with the arc of any particular private accomplishment. Just as the coordination
function does not depend directly on who is awarded patents, it does not
necessarily depend on the precise timing of when they become eligible for
patents.
However, there is another set of timing concerns that does matter for the
coordination function. The first relates to the fact of technological change. The
coordination function works by assuring a firm disclosing confidential
information that it will be able to regain control of how that information is
used later on.'89 The ability of patents to do this depends on the relationship
between the exclusive rights in the firm's portfolio and the subject matter of
the information to be disclosed in reliance on that portfolio. This relationship
can evolve over time. As technology progresses, a portfolio that might have
once facilitated a lot of information exchange may cease to be useful for
coordination. For example, a thick pile of patents related to VHS tapes may
have had a lot of coordination value to consumer electronics manufacturers in
the 1980s and 1990s, but such a portfolio likely lost much of this value as the
industry moved to DVDs and Blu-Rays. If technology moves on but the firm's
186 See id. at 187-88 (discussing the possibility of gamesmanship around timing of patent
grants).
187 See Kitch, supra note 3, at 276-77.
188 See Abramowicz, supra note 33, at 1080-81; Duffy, supra note 3, at 476-80; Kieff,
supra note 33, at 710-12; Sichelman, supra note 30, at 393-94.
189 See supra Section IILA.
1608 [Vol. 96:1565
COORDINATION-FOCUSED PATENT POLICY
portfolio stays the same, both the likelihood of successful patent-based
exclusion and the value of that exclusion will fall. As the relationship between
the firm's present activities and its patent portfolio weakens, patent-based
exclusion ceases to be a realistic fallback, and the effectiveness of the
coordination function is reduced.
Another concern arises from the fact that patent grants are statutorily limited
in time. In some situations, this legal expiration date may make patent
remedies a very weak substitute for secrecy. For example, if a patent is set to
expire in six months, it may do little to backstop the transfer of information
that could have been profitably kept secret for a longer time period. This does
not mean patents with little term left are useless for coordination--only that
the types of information transfer a patent can facilitate will diminish over its
lifetime. For example, even a single year of patent protection may be enough to
enable the exchange of information with only short-term value, or with value
that could not have been effectively maintained for very long under secrecy
anyhow. The ability of a patent to backstop information exchange thus turns on
both the length of the patent's remaining term and the length of time that the
information could have been kept secret in the absence of a voluntary
disclosure.190 Holding all else equal, the ability of a patent to facilitate
disclosure will diminish as expiration nears.
A third concern cuts the other way. While the twin threats of technical
obsolescence and legal expiration tend to reduce the usefulness of patents over
time, the need for reliability tends to favor older patents. Typically, a patent
application starts with a large amount of uncertainty that gradually resolves
over time. Beginning with the initial filing of an application, there is often
doubt as to whether a patent will issue, whether it will hold up in court, what
exactly it will be able to exclude, and so on.
191 As time goes on, more
information is revealed: the patent office grants a patent (or does not),
competitors introduce prior art (or do not), validity challenges are brought (or
are not), a court affirms the patent's broad scope (or narrows it). Each round of
review reduces uncertainty about the strength and scope of the patent rights in
question.
190 This implies there may be some information transfers that cannot be very effectively
backstopped even by young patents-such as disclosures of information with significant
long-term value that could have been protected by secrecy for much longer than the patent
term. See Steven N.S. Cheung, Property Rights in Trade Secrets, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 40, 43
(1982) (describing valuable technical information kept secret for more than a century).
191 To be sure, there may be some cases where even early-stage applications or young
patents have a high degree of reliability. For example, some breakthroughs might be so
significant that an inventor can be confident that she is the first to arrive at a particular
solution, even before the formal steps of patent office review and district court litigation
have occurred.
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Though developments for individual patents can go in either direction, a
survivorship effect causes the reliability of patents to rise over time. A good
number of patents fail-they are rejected, invalidated, or their scope is
narrowed substantially-and hence become irrelevant for purposes of
coordination. Others survive-they issue, their validity is affined, their scope
is interpreted broadly. And these survivors begin to provide a predictable
sphere of exclusion within which firms can exchange information with lower
risk. Because of this survivorship effect, older, previously tested patents are
more likely to be reliable, and thus may have more ability to backstop
information exchange than younger patents or still-pending applications.
These competing considerations inform when a patent will reach its peak
usefulness for purposes of coordination. Often, if a patent is too young, it will
not be reliable enough to backstop the exchange of information. But, on the
other hand, if a patent is too old, it will also not be useful for backstopping
exchange, either because of its limited remaining term or the looming threat of
technical obsolescence. As a result, the coordination value of any given patent
likely peaks somewhere in the middle of its lifespan: after the patent has issued
(and perhaps survived some degree of post-grant litigation or administrative
review), but before further technological development makes it irrelevant to
ongoing industry activities. It is these patents in the middle-sufficiently
tested, but not yet obsolete-that are best positioned to serve the coordination
function.
192
These timing considerations suggest this is another area where the
longstanding assumptions about coordination theory must be updated. The
conventional wisdom is that the coordination function requires awarding patent
rights at very early stages of technical development.193 But, upon examination,
it is not clear whether the coordination function requires triggering patent
eligibility any earlier in time than the rewards function does. Direct
comparisons are difficult, since the optimal timing of patent eligibility for
purposes of the rewards function is so complicated.194 But, in practice, the
current rewards-focused system allows for patent eligibility quite early in the
192 Without a stable stock of patents meeting these criteria, the coordination function may
run in fits and starts. For example, there may have been some period of time when VHS
patents were obsolete but the industry's DVD patents were not yet mature. If that were the
case, the ability of patents to facilitate information exchange would be expected to wane
during the interim. Moreover, in some industries, technology may move so much faster than
the patent system that the opportunity for patent-backed information exchange is virtually
nonexistent. See Mann, supra note 75, at 978-79.
193 As with the question of claim scope, this assumed policy implication goes back to
some of the earliest discussions of the coordination function. See Kitch, supra note 3, at
267-68.
194 See supra note 188.
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development process, typically well before inventions have been
commercialized or reduced to practical form.195
The success of the coordination function does not turn directly on when
inventions become patent-eligible at all. Instead, the coordination function is
sensitive to the window of patent maturity-the time between when a patent
becomes reliable and when it expires or becomes technologically irrelevant. Of
course, the coordination function has some dependence on the timing of
eligibility, because a patent cannot be reliable if there is no legal right to claim
it yet. But the timing of patent eligibility and the timing of patent maturity can
often be manipulated independently. One could, hypothetically, design a patent
system that puts the finish line for patentability fairly late in the development
process-for example, only after a commercially viable prototype is physically
presented to patent examiners-but hat then moves to escalate the reliability
of those rights with lightning speed-an intense one-month examination
window, say, followed by an irrebuttable presumption of validity. Even though
such a system would set patent eligibility at a comparatively late point in time,
it would allow patents to become reliable at a comparatively early point in
time, thus allowing the system to serve a coordination function despite the late
patent grants.
Viewed from the perspective of the coordination function, the current timing
of patent rights leaves much to be desired. Inventions become eligible for
patenting early in the development process, but it is typically years before any
patents actually issue,196 and years still before those patents become reliable
through testing in litigation or administrative review. 97 These steps not only
delay when patents will be available for coordination, but also shorten the
expected window during which they will be useful, as technical obsolescence
always looms on the horizon.
198
Surprisingly, then, a move towards coordination might actually mean more
freedom when it comes to the substantive doctrines that control the timing of
patent eligibility. 19 9 Instead of requiring "broad, early grants,"2°° the
195 See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS
L.J. 65, 72-82 (2009); Sichelman, supra note 30, at 355-66.
196 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 17 (2014),
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2014PAR.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7M6-
HKUU] (reporting that the average time to first action after a patent application is eighteen
months and average total pendency is twenty-seven months).
197 See generally Dolin, supra note 147.
198 See Feldman & Lemley, supra note 7, at 173 (observing that rapid technical
obsolescence combined with patent office delays may prevent patents from facilitating
technology transfer).
'19 The most prominent doctrines controlling the timing of patent eligibility are the
requirements of enablement, written description, and patentable subject matter. See
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coordination function depends on the process of patenting-things like the
number of patent examiners, the speed and efficiency of the patent office, the
window for administrative review, and the level of deference paid to these
early rounds of administrative decisionmaking. As a result, the timing concerns
of the coordination function may have more to do with the backlog of
applications pending at the patent office than the substantive doctrines of
patent eligibility with which it is so often associated.
D. Core Rights over Bundle of Value
Another important difference between the rewards function and the
coordination function is the manner in which different policies interact to
influence the patent system's effectiveness overall. As the rewards function
depends on transferring a prize of appropriate private value to an inventor,
courts and commentators typically evaluate the patent system from a "total
bundle of value" perspective, which considers the costs and benefits of
participating in the patent system from start to finish. By contrast, the
effectiveness of the coordination function depends significantly on patent
holders having a certain core set of rights at a particular juncture in time. This
difference suggests that courts and commentators would need to approach their
tasks differently if coordination goals were to gradually displace rewards goals.
The conventional approach to rewards-focused policymaking calls for
careful stewardship of the entire value proposition the patent system presents
to prospective inventors.20 1 The lure of patenting depends on the details of
every step of the process: the cost of filing an application, the length of patent
term, the methodology for calculating damages, the availability of exhaustion
defenses, the licensing terms that are prohibited by antitrust law, and so on.
Further complicating matters, in a perfect world, a policymaker would
coordinate all these tools to provide an appropriate reward to inventors at the
lowest possible cost to society.202 The underlying theory is indifferent to the
question of how invention is rewarded, so a policymaker has a great deal of
flexibility in assembling the package of rights and duties that will do so at the
least cost.
These rewards-focused trade-offs are not limited to questions of patent law.
Under the rewards view, almost anytime there is a question involving the
intersection of patent law and another field of law (such as contracts or
antitrust), there is an opportunity to infuse the prevailing doctrine of the other
domain with patent-specific considerations.20 3 Indeed, almost any legal
Sichelman, supra note 30, at 355.
200 See supra notes 14, 58.
201 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
202 See Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 46, at 106; Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1830-33.
203 See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673-74 (1969) (declining to enforce
contractual term based on patent policy concerns); Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food
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question that arises in the lifecycle of a patent is potentially relevant for
refining the patentee's bundle.2 04 The basic fungibility at the heart of rewards-
focused policymaking results in a nearly limitless terrain of policy levers.
When it comes to the coordination function, however, such far-reaching
substitutability cannot be assumed. The core features of strong and reliable
patent-based exclusion cannot be traded against other features of patent policy.
Rather than balancing the total value proposition of the patent bundle against
deadweight losses, patent policymakers would need to focus on ensuring that
the bundle contains the core rights necessary to enable information transfer.
205
In some ways this shift is constraining, but in other ways it is liberating. The
constraint is that the coordination function leaves a policymaker with far less
latitude to compromise the core patent rights and make up the difference
somewhere else. On the other hand, the emphasis on core rights creates
freedom of movement on many other questions. For example, patent
application fees and examination standards can be adjusted based on
administrative considerations, and without regard for the rewards-focused
concern that such changes will undermine the system's value to prospective
inventors. Moreover, it becomes possible to restore the integrity of adjacent
areas of law (such as antitrust and contract) that have become infused with
overtones of patent policymaking. Under the coordination function, there is not
the same need to enlist noncore doctrines in service of patent law.
One could debate whether, on balance, these changes are more constraining
than they are liberating, or vice versa. But they are certainly quite simplifying.
As others have observed, assembling a bundle of rights that will transfer an
appropriate reward to inventors at the lowest possible cost to society is much
easier said than done.206 For example, is it more cost-effective to reward
Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 179-80 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Brulotte v.
Thys Co., 397 U.S. 29, 31-34 (1964); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d
1322, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (refusing to impose antitrust liability for unconditional
refusal to sell patented parts absent fraud on the patent office, sham litigation, or illegal
tying); Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a patent monopolist's desire to exclude others from the patented technology is
a "presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to consumers").
204 See Crane, supra note 47, at 271-75; Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1855-67; Ordover,
supra note 65, at 50.
205 To be clear, this does not mean that the coordination function depends only on the
simple right to exclude others from using transferred information. One can imagine drastic
policies that would frustrate the coordination function just as well-for example,
confiscatory taxes on patent transfers that would prevent patents from reaching the hands of
those who are well-positioned to use them to backstop information transfers. See supra
Section 1I.B.1. However, short of such extremes, there is a broad range of policy
alternatives that will make little difference for the coordination function.
206 See Gallini, supra note 50, at 63; Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 46, at 106; Kaplow,
supra note 1, at 1842-45; Klemperer, supra note 46, at 120-24; Oskar Liivak, Establishing
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invention by expanding antitrust immunities, or by requiring a higher burden
of proof to invalidate an issued claim? Is it preferable to reduce the scope of
patent remedies, or raise application fees? Sometimes, perhaps, a rewards-
focused policymaker will have the information she needs to appropriately
balance these objectives. But sometimes-perhaps even frequently2°7- -
rewards theory will point in indeterminate or conflicting directions, requiring
consideration of secondary factors to break the tie.
In this way, recognition of the potential coordination value of the patent
system could be useful even if coordination goals do not displace rewards
goals. The optimal policy for implementing the coordination function will
sometimes be ambiguous as well, but lessons from coordination theory are
often revealing in situations where rewards theory is ambivalent. For example,
as between an additional antitrust immunity that will be extremely valuable to
patentees on rare occasions and an equally valuable but modest increase in the
likelihood a court will find a claim valid, the coordination function would
break the tie in favor of the latter. Antitrust giveaways have (at most) an
indirect effect on the coordination function, while improvements in the
reliability of patents are almost always helpful. Similarly, as between reducing
the scope of patent remedies and increasing the cost of obtaining a patent, the
coordination function again provides a clear answer: As far as coordination is
concerned, there is little harm to increasing the cost of acquiring a patent, but
the force of patent remedies is directly determinative of the system's
effectiveness. If the rewards function is indifferent, the policymaker is better
off increasing acquisition costs rather than trimming the scope of patent-based
exclusion.
In this way, coordination theory could have an important role to play in
patent policy, even if the coordination function itself is only recognized as a
secondary goal of the patent system. While each case will require its own
analysis, as a general rule coordination theory would advise rewarding
invention through straightforward, reliable rights to exclude, rather than
through more complex bundles of value.
CONCLUSION
This Article has defined the coordination function, set out a theory of that
function's operation, and shown how a number of characteristics of the patent
system would likely be different if it were geared towards coordination instead
of rewards. This analysis suggests that much of the prior debate about the
desirability of using the patent system to pursue these goals has been rooted in
unfounded assumptions about what such a system would actually look like.
an Island of Patent Sanity, 78 BROOK. L. REv. 1355, 1349-50 (2013); Liivak, supra note 10,
at 1175.
207 See Liivak, supra note 206, at 1337.
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However, it is important to note what this Article has not done: It has not
made a case either for or against the coordination function. This Article accepts
the coordination justification for the sake of argument in order to explore its
underlying theory and consequences for patent policy. It does not evaluate the
costs and benefits of using patents in this way, and certainly does not suggest
that the normative desirability of coordination goals is a foregone conclusion.
This Article is studiously neutral on these first-order matters for a simple
reason: a deeper understanding of the policy implications of the coordination
function is a critical prerequisite to evaluating the desirability of using the
patent system this way. In some ways, the requirements of the coordination
function may be a refreshing change from the concerns that have so far driven
rewards-focused patent policy. In other ways, a coordination-focused approach
to policymaking may only exaggerate present concerns with the rewards-
focused system. In either event, it is clear that the differences between a
rewards-focused and coordination-focused system are real, and these
differences may be enough to seal the case for or against the coordination
function.
There is also a need for future work comparing the expected costs and
benefits of addressing coordination problems through both patent and
nonpatent mechanisms. In the absence of patent protection, parties seeking to
forge agreements for or around technical information can be expected to rely
on a combination of trade secrets, reputational interests, noncompete
agreements, and other contractual restraints. The comparative costs and
benefits of these approaches vis-A-vis patents remain largely unexplored.
Moreover, it is unclear whether the case for the coordination function will
be the same across all of the various technical fields that share our unified
patent system. It is possible that contracts and trade secrets work well enough
for some industries, while the need for patent-backed information exchange in
other industries is acute. Just as the case for the rewards function varies from
industry to industry,208 the case for coordination may be strong in some fields
and weak in others. It would be particularly valuable to understand how the
rewards and coordination justifications interact on an industry-by-industry
basis.
It is also possible that the right question to ask may be not whether or not it
is desirable to use the patent system to facilitate coordination, but how much
patent-based coordination is worth its cost. It is one thing to accept that the
patent system is useful for facilitating some amount of coordination, yet
another thing to determine the optimal level of patent-backed coordination.
Future work will need to address the question of when the costs of these
exclusive rights begin to exceed their benefits.
Finally, the ultimate goal of this inquiry will likely be to re-integrate the
rewards and coordination functions for a unified approach to patent policy. As
208 See generally BuRK & LEMLEY, supra note 14.
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many of the costs of using a system of proprietary rights to incentivize
invention are shared with the costs of using the same system to coordinate
private development, it is quite possible that the optimal level of rewards-
focused patent protection and the optimal level of coordination-focused patent
protection are interdependent. In other words, there may be significant
synergies available by using the patent system for both purposes
simultaneously, enabling a degree of protection that would not be justified by
either benefit standing alone. And, conversely, new developments undermining
one justification may cause the optimal level of both kinds of protection to fall,
inasmuch as each depends on the other. There thus remains much to be
explored regarding the interrelationship of these two functions.
